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Introduction 
 
Purpose of this study 
In various industries or markets, to say nothing when a market is monopoly, even though when a 
market is oligopoly, there exists a dominant firm. Dominant firm may exert market power in the 
market where it is active or may give market power to its adjacent markets. Then, the behavior 
results in harming fair competition. This thesis aims to study whether or how structural regulation is 
needed for markets where a dominant firm exists. In particular, the thesis focuses on a dominant firm 
in the context of vertical relationship in industry.   
    We can consider structural regulation in various settings. First one is the case where rival firms 
exist against a dominant firm. If the rivals take any behaviors, the competition may work well in the 
market. On the other hand, if anti-competitive effect can happen after that, regulation on the rival’s 
behaviors are needed. Second one is the case that even if the rival firms are active in the market, fair 
competition can be detrimental because the rivals cannot improve their productive efficiencies by 
themselves. Efficiency gap between an incumbent and entrants can be a matter in liberalized market. 
Third one is the case of natural monopoly, where rival firms do not exist. The industry of natural 
monopoly has problems that what regulation is needed on price or behavior of monopolistic unit and 
that how vertical structure of the industry should be reformed. While there is a lot of study for above 
issues, it remains important problems ought to be reconsidered by adding significant data which has 
been ignored or modifying model settings. This thesis investigates three issues picked up above by 
supposing specific cases empirically and theoretically. Next, I explain the structure of thesis for each 
chapter.   
 
Structure of thesis  
This thesis is consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 is the empirical analysis on a horizontal merger 
case in Japanese steel industry. Chapter 2 theoretically examines the effects of ownership structures 
of nuclear power plants on fair competition and total output. Chapter 3 compares theoretically two 
patterns of vertical form of the industry where essential input is monopolistically supplied to 
downstream competing firms. I explain each chapter in detail as follow. 
    Chapter 1, related with the case where a dominant firm and its rival firms are competing, 
estimates the effect of the NKK and Kawasaki Steel merger in Japanese steel industry; NKK and 
Kawasaki Steel are the rival firms to a dominant firm, Nippon steel. Before the merger, Nippon steel 
supplied the output of crude steel is approximately twice as much as NKK and Kawasaki Steel by 
each. After the merger, the output of crude steel supplied by the merging firm rose to be comparable 
to the output supplied by Nippon steel. The estimation methodology is a conventional event study by 
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using stock returns data for each firm. The NKK and Kawasaki Steel merger is also studied by 
Yanagida (2011). While she focuses a subject of the investigation on only the merging firm and its 
rival firms, this chapter also focuses on customer firms. In this context, the customer firms are those 
who buy steel products as an input from the upstream merging firm and its rivals. The reason why 
we also focus on the customer firms is that to estimate if the merger is for anti-competitive or 
efficiency gain, following Williamson (1968) points out. As a result, as far as focusing on the 
abnormal stock returns to the merging firm and the rivals, the merger seems to be anti-competitive. 
However, taking into account of the abnormal returns to the customer firms and the transition of the 
price of steel product upstream, we conclude that the merger can be for efficiency gain.    
Chapter 2 is related with the case where the rival firms cannot reduce the gap by themselves in 
productive efficiencies between the rivals and a dominant incumbent firm. Specifically, liberalized 
electricity market is assumed in this study. In France, the incumbent, EDF has been owned nuclear 
power plants exclusively since before the introducing of competition to the electricity retail market. 
Because nuclear power plants are operated in lower marginal cost, the entrant rivals without holding 
nuclear power plants could not become rivalry with the EDF. This situation was to be a matter of 
unfair competition. To tackle with the problem, France employed the policy that forces EDF to sell a 
portion of nuclear power at marginal cost to the rivals; the policy is called the NOME law. Referring 
a theoretical work by Créti et al.(2013), the NOME law is effective on expanding total output 
downstream. This chapter proposes public ownership; the idea is that taking nuclear power plants 
out of the incumbent to public firm upstream. We find under more realistic assumption that the 
NOME law is more desirable socially than public ownership and it also can benefit the incumbent’s 
interest. Therefore, the NOME law has economic reasons rather than political compromise that 
public ownership is not employed.  
    Chapter 3 examines problems of vertically related industries consist of natural monopoly 
upstream and competitive downstream market. This vertical structure can be observed at various 
network industries: telecommunication, gas, electricity etc. and industries where scarce resources or 
patent licenses are sold to downstream firms. The upstream monopolist can not only exert market 
power in upstream market but also give market power to any downstream firms. There are mainly 
two strands of study for the issues of such industries, how to regulate a monopolist and how to 
design the vertical form. Chapter 3 focuses on the latter. When the upstream monopolist vertically 
integrates with a downstream firm, the integrated firm supplies the essential input to other 
downstream rivals and also supplies final goods/services to consumer in downstream market. 
Vertical integration is usually, as Perry (1989) summarizes, beneficial to not only the integrated firm 
but also consumers because it overcomes the double marginalization problem. It is said however that 
there are two anti-competitive concerns about the vertically integrated firm: sabotage (non-price 
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discrimination) and margin squeeze. To tackle with these potential issues, alternative vertical forms 
have been proposed by researchers and practitioners. Specifically, under the price for essential input 
is regulated, it is discussed with comparing vertical integration, legal unbundling and ownership 
separation. For instance, Höffler and Kranz (2011a) show that the total downstream output under 
legal unbundling can be larger than other forms. This is because the upstream monopolist does not 
have incentive to raise the downstream rival’s cost when the essential input price is regulated 
constant exogenously. Chapter 3 shows as follow. If the upstream monopolist is unregulated, margin 
squeeze does happen but sabotage would not be taken when the downstream rival is more efficient, 
and then the rival can be active under vertical integration. Vertical integration outperforms legal 
unbundling in terms of total output and consumer surplus. Moreover, even when the downstream 
rival is foreclosed from the market, the result is maintained. Result obtained in Chapter 3 is opposite 
to current studies assuming regulated upstream monopolist. 
The remainder of this thesis is constructed by each chapter. Chapter 1 is entitled “Analysis of 
the merger effect using the event study approach: Evidence from the steel industry in Japan”. 
Chapter 2 is entitled “Ownership structure of nuclear power plants for fair competition and 
efficiency: The NOME law versus public ownership”. Chapter 3 is entitled “Unregulated upstream 
monopolist in vertical structure: Vertical integration versus legal unbundling”. In conclusion, I 
summarize the results obtained in each chapter and propose some ideas for future research.   
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Chapter 1 
Analysis of the merger effect using the event study approach:  
Evidence from the steel industry in Japan 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Competition authorities regulate horizontal mergers ex ante and, along with corporate managers, 
seek to understand their effects. After being notified, they (e.g., the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
(JFTC) and the European Commission (EC)) have one month to decide whether a merger falls 
within their jurisdiction and whether it complies with regulations. This paper examines ways of 
determining, in advance, whether a merger will result in anticompetitive effects or production 
efficiency effects, by investigating the NKK and Kawasaki Steel merger in the Japanese steel 
industry, which was announced in April 2001 and completed in October 2002. The merged firms 
became the second-largest company in Japan and the third-largest company in the world in terms of 
quantity of crude steel production. As large mergers are likely to have large economic impacts, 
investigating this case can help in understanding the complex effects of mergers.1 
Williamson (1968) proposed that horizontal mergers involve a trade-off between production 
efficiency effects and anticompetitive effects. To consider the effects of mergers, I examine 
customers in vertical relationships with the merging firms. If steel prices decrease as a result of an 
efficiency gain, the customer firms in the steel industry would enjoy reduced steel input costs and 
would anticipate enhanced corporate valuation.2 The JFTC and the EC evaluate each horizontal 
merger after notification, by verifying an efficiency-based consumer welfare standard.  
We chose an event study approach for several reasons.3 In Japan, although merger notifications 
formally occur in advance, many planned mergers are announced via preliminary consultation prior 
to the official advance notification.4 The merger notification procedure is implemented within 30 
days. The information used to judge mergers includes goods prices, production quantity, corporate 
                                                   
1 The result of the NKK and Kawasaki Steel merger, JFE holdings, forecasted the following synergy 
effect in a corporate news release on April 13, 2001: “Building a solid business base by strengthening the 
capability to respond to global customer requirements.” 
2 As we explain in Section 1.2, customers’ steel procurement reforms, designed to strengthen customer 
firms, had begun before the merger, in Japan’s auto industry. This is considered to have strengthened the 
auto industry’s buying power relative to that of the steel industry. 
3 Whinston’s (2006) and Davis and Garcés’ (2010) textbooks on antitrust economics and competition 
policy contain merger analyses using event studies. Whinston (2006) argues that event studies are 
particularly useful if they consider the mergers’ effects on customers. 
4 In the United States and the European Union, merger plans are announced to the authorities in charge of 
competition policies in advance (i.e., prior to merger completion). See, for example, Kawahama (2008). 
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financial data, stock data, and surveys of firms with an interest in the merger. The merger of NKK 
and Kawasaki Steel was processed via preliminary consultation. We analyse the reactions of stock 
returns to merger announcements, including not only the merging and rival firms but also their 
customer firms.5  
This study estimates abnormal returns based on four types of estimation windows, and 
examines three event windows with respect to each estimation window. We thus obtain results from 
twelve abnormal return patterns for each firm. In addition, we use a sampling of Japanese customer 
firms to further investigate the effects of the merger. The merger of NKK and Kawasaki Steel 
appears to yield an efficiency gain when we consider the event study results of customer firms.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 provides a timeline of events related 
to the merger of NKK and Kawasaki Steel. Section 1.3 surveys the relevant literature and proposes 
hypotheses. Section 1.4 describes our data sources and processes. Section 1.5 discusses the analysis 
methodology. Section 1.6 provides the results of the event study. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes this 
study. 
 
1.2. Steel Industry in Japan 
This section discusses news reported by Nikkei about the steel industry and its customer industries in 
Japan through April 2001, when Kawasaki Steel and NKK announced their merger. 
 
• October 18, 1999. Nissan Motors announced its ‘Revival Plan’, which included selecting the 
cheapest steel suppliers to reduce costs.6 
 
• April 7, 2000. NKK and Kawasaki Steel formed an alliance between their logistics and 
maintenance sections (excluding the production and sales sections) to counter the power of 
Nippon Steel.  
 
• 2:00 PM, April 13, 2001. The CEOs of NKK and Kawasaki Steel announced that they would 
integrate their businesses and create a stock holding company, called ‘JFE Holdings’, with a 
jointly affiliated steel production unit. This substantial horizontal merger took place in October 
2002. 
 
 
                                                   
5 Because merger guidelines recognize consumers as being not only final consumers but also 
intermediate consumers, this study examines steel-consuming customer firms. 
6 Thus, the merger seems to have resulted in not only a production efficiency gain but also a stronger 
selling position to big steel consumers such as auto companies. 
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Figure 1-1: Crude steel output per firm (million metric tons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Top Steel-Producing Companies, World Steel Association 
Note: NKK is absent after 2002 because it merged with Kawasaki Steel. 
 
Figure 1-1 shows the yearly change in the crude steel output of blast furnace firms in Japan. The 
merger of NKK and Kawasaki Steel increased their joint crude steel output in comparison Nippon 
Steel after the merger’s completion in October 2002.  
 
1.3. Related literature and hypotheses 
This section reviews the related literature. Many US studies of horizontal mergers have successfully 
used the event study method. Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983), who examined the reactions of 
merging firms and their industry rivals, are representative. They argue that the positive abnormal 
returns enjoyed by merging and rival firms result from anticompetitive mergers, not efficiency gains. 
Mullin et al. (1995), using the event study method to analyse railroad companies as customer firms, 
argue that steel prices would decrease and railroad companies would increase their surplus if US 
Steel was dissolved.  
Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005), using a large sample, examine the reactions of 
merging firms, their rivals, and their corporate customers and suppliers. Fee and Thomas (2004) and 
Shahrur (2005) find evidence about mergers that is inconsistent with collusion theory but consistent 
with buying power motivation. In particular, Shahrur (2005), using input–output tables to identify 
downstream industries, finds significant positive abnormal returns going to rivals, suppliers, and 
corporate customers. Thus, he suggests that the average takeover in his sample is driven by the 
efficiency objective.7 
                                                   
7 Along this line, Bhattacharya and Nain (2011) and Ahern (2012) also use large firm samples as well as 
event studies and performance studies. They are interested in the general interactions within supply chains 
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Utilizing stock price evidence, Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005, 2010) show the welfare effect of 
mergers in their theoretical study. While the anticompetitive effect can be identified immediately 
around the merger announcement date, the efficiency effect takes longer to emerge; thus, only the 
anticompetitive effect is reflected in stock value. These studies emphasise the importance of 
examining customer firms when analysing the impact of mergers on economic welfare.8 
Yanagida (2011) reports that the merger between Kawasaki Steel and NKK was value 
enhancing for both the merging and rival firms. 
The terms ‘anticompetitive effects’ and ‘production efficiency effects’ must be defined. In an 
anticompetitive effect, the merging and rival firms increase their profits by exerting market power 
and, thus, enjoy higher stock market valuations. Meanwhile, customer firms lose profits because of 
increased input costs and, thus, suffer lower stock market valuations.  
The effect of production efficiency brought by mergers influence the customer firms in two 
ways. When economies of scale get larger, both the price of intermediate goods and the customer 
firms’ input costs fall; they increase, on the other hand, when economies of scale shrink. 
An event study is an evaluation methodology that calculates abnormal stock returns in order to 
identify the reaction of stock market participants to unexpected events, such as merger and 
acquisition announcements. Event studies have conventionally assumed a semi-strong efficient stock 
market. This assumption carries three implications: First, stock market participants usually cannot 
arbitrage using public information. Second, new information is reflected in stock prices immediately 
and correctly. Third, stock market participants cannot avoid systematic risk, although they can avoid 
unsystematic risk by composing a portfolio. Thus, a firm’s stock price reflects its fundamental value, 
and changes in stock prices result from new information about a firm’s value. This paper follows the 
above assumptions. 
Table 1-1, following Shahrur (2005), shows the anticompetitive and production efficiency 
effects relevant to the signs of the abnormal stock returns flowing to the merging firms, rival firms, 
and customer firms, as observed on the merger announcement date.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
caused by horizontal mergers. They explain bargaining power, particularly buying power, as an outcome 
of horizontal mergers.  
8 Duso et al. (2011) examine the effectiveness of merger control in the European Union, focusing on 
whether competition authorities deter anticompetitive mergers effectively. 
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Table 1-1: Signs of abnormal returns in merger announcement 
 
1.4. Data 
First, the event study approach requires an event date. In this study, the event date is defined as the 
merger announcement date (i.e., the day when stock market participants become sure of the merger). 
The Nikkei newspaper reports that the CEOs of Kawasaki Steel and NKK held a joint press 
conference on Friday April 13, 2001, at 2 PM to say that they would complete the merger by October 
2002. Because the Tokyo Stock Market is open until 3 PM, information about the merger was first 
reflected in the stock values on that date. We, therefore, identify the event date as April 13, 2001.  
Stock price data were obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS Financial QUEST database. Every stock 
price we use in this study was selected from the Tokyo Stock Market First Section. The sample’s 
data period spans from March 10, 2000, to May 16, 2001, for the firms’ daily returns. The daily 
stock return for firm i at time t is defined as 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)/𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the stock 
price at time t. We explain the key terms in this study below. The merging industry is the steel 
industry, consisting of blast furnace steelmakers in Japan. The merging firms under study are the 
acquiring firm, Kawasaki Steel, and the acquired firm, NKK. The horizontal rivals are all other firms 
in the merging firms’ industry.  
It is also important to identify the customer firms in the merging firms’ industry.9 These have 
been drawn from the auto, shipbuilding, construction, and steel-processing industries; the latter firms 
consist of manufacturers of steel pipe, steel plate, and/or steel wire and are classified using the 
three-digit Nikkei Industry List Small Classification (NKILS) in Financial QUEST. 
Their relevant classification code numbers are 17162 (for open-arc furnace/single steel process), 
17163 (for special steel), and 1716 (for other steel metals), which correspond to the Japan Standard 
Industry Code 3 (JSIC3). We selected a maximum of 10 firms belonging to each industry using the 
market capitalization rank from the Tokyo Stock Market First Section.  
 
                                                   
9 In preparing this paper, I was asked about the size of each transaction. COSMOS, the database of 
Teikoku Data Bank, lists the names of the main customers but not the quantity of steel involved in the 
transaction. Therefore, I could not find detailed evidence of individual transactions.  
 Merging firm Rivals Customers 
Anticompetitive effect Positive Positive Negative 
Efficiency effect Positive Negative Positive/Negative 
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Figure 1-2: Image of event study 
 
 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏1                   𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏2 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏3                   𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏4 
                                                       t = 0 
 
Estimation window = 𝐿𝐿1               Event window = 𝐿𝐿2 
 
There were six firms in the steel industry before the merger and five afterwards. There were ten 
customer firms in the auto industry, ten in the construction industry, eight in the steel-processing 
industries, and six in the shipbuilding industry.  
 
1.5. Methodology 
Following McKinlay (1997), we calculate the abnormal return around the announcement date, and 
its sign, and then test its statistical significance. We define the event date as the day when the stock 
market reacted to the information about the merger. We set the announcement date at April 13, 2001. 
We set four types of estimation windows, and three event windows with respect to each estimation 
window. In this regard, we examine the abnormal returns in twelve patterns. Figure 1-2 presents the 
daily time interval used in this event study. 
 
1.5.1 Estimation model 
First, we estimate the ordinary least square (OLS) parameters in a market model represented as 
equation (1) to obtain the normal return. A market model is a statistical model used to explain the 
individual return on a market value–weighted return based on the efficient-market hypothesis. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡             (1-1) 
 
where  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return to firm i, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the market value–weighted return, which is the return of 
TOPIX, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term for firm i at time t.  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is distributed with a mean of zero and a 
variance of 𝜎𝜎2. The announcement date is defined as t = 0; 𝐿𝐿1 is the estimation window, the daily 
time interval for estimate parameters 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 in equation (1). Finally, 𝐿𝐿2 is the event window 
reflecting the merger- related information influencing stock prices. 
    The procedure is as follows. First, we use the data of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 in the estimation window 
and then perform an OLS regression. Many studies use 200 days as the estimation window. However, 
because there is no theoretical reason to use only 200 days, this study uses four types of estimation 
windows (i.e., 250-day, 200-day, 150-day and 100-day) in order to check robustness over the lengths 
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of estimation windows. The event windows provide three different lengths: 𝐿𝐿2 = 41, 𝐿𝐿2 = 31, 
and 𝐿𝐿2 = 21. The length of each estimation window is adjusted according to the length of the event 
windows in the following way. We change the length of the event window to reflect the 
merger-related information on stock prices. For example, the 250-day estimation window would 
be  𝐿𝐿1 = 250 , 𝐿𝐿1 = 255 , and 𝐿𝐿1 = 260  according to each event window:  𝐿𝐿2 = 41 , 𝐿𝐿2 = 31 , 
and 𝐿𝐿2 = 21. In other words, the estimation window would run from 𝜏𝜏1 = −271 to 𝜏𝜏2 = −21 for 
an event window running from 𝜏𝜏3 = −20 to 𝜏𝜏4 = +20. Likewise, it would run from 𝜏𝜏1 = −221 to 
𝜏𝜏2 = −16 for an event window running from 𝜏𝜏3 = −15 to 𝜏𝜏4 = +15. Now, 
 
𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − (𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝚤𝚤�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡)                            (1-2) 
 
where  𝛼𝛼𝚤𝚤� , 𝛽𝛽𝚤𝚤� , and 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are estimated parameters. Specifically, 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the residual between the actual 
return and the estimated normal return. If the estimated parameters were not statistically significant 
for a specific firm, we did not include the firm in the event study. 
Second, we use the data for the returns in each event window and the estimated parameters 
𝛼𝛼𝚤𝚤�  and  𝛽𝛽𝚤𝚤�  in order to compute abnormal returns. Because 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  and 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡∗  are returns in an event 
window, the abnormal return (AR) 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  is calculated as  
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 ≡ 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ − � 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝚤𝚤�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡∗ �                        (1-3) 
 
Equation (3) shows that an abnormal return is the difference between the observed return and the 
estimated normal return in an event window. A normal return in an event window is the return that 
would be expected were the merger not to occur. To test whether an abnormal return is statistically 
significant in an event window, the variance of the abnormal return is estimated. For example, if the 
estimation window is 𝐿𝐿1 = 200, the variance of the abnormal return is estimated as  
 
𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖
2 = 1200− 2 � �𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡�2−21
𝑡𝑡=−221
                          (1-4) 
 
Equation (4) is a sample variance. The variance of 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in an estimation window is substituted for 
variance 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  in an event window.  
    A cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is generally defined as in equation (5). A CAR represents 
the change in stockholders’ wealth when they buy and hold stocks. Now, 
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𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) = � 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝜏𝜏2
𝑡𝑡=𝜏𝜏1
                            (1-5) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) is normally distributed in event window −21 < 𝜏𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 20; that is, 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2)~𝑁𝑁 �  0,   Var[𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2)�  ) where      Var[𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2)] = 𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖2(𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) = � 𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏2
𝑡𝑡=𝜏𝜏1
                 (1-6) 
 
The test statistic of 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) is 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2)
� Var[𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤� (𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2)] ~𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁(0,1)                   (1-7) 
 
Moreover, we test the null hypothesis that AR or CAR equals zero. The test statistic (7) conforms to t 
distribution with a degree of freedom of 𝐿𝐿1 − 2. However, because the estimation window is large 
enough, test statistic (7) conforms to normal distribution asymptotically. 
 
1.6. Results 
Because this merger was substantially announced at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 in the afternoon and announced to the 
press at 𝑡𝑡 = +1 in the morning, we observe AR and CAR, in particular, at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡 = +1. An 
abnormal return to the merging firm is computed as the weighted average abnormal return based on 
market capitalization at the end of March 2001. For NKK and Kawasaki Steel, these amount to 
299,830,520,000 and 403,698,450,000 yen, respectively. The ARs and CARs are obtained for 
250-day, 200-day, 150-day, and 100-day estimation windows. Each window is tested at three event 
windows: 𝐿𝐿2 = (−20, +20),  𝐿𝐿2 = (−15, +15) ,  𝐿𝐿2 = (−10, +10) and  𝐿𝐿2 = (−1, +1) . This 
yields twelve AR patterns for each firm. 
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Figure 1-3: Average changes in statistical significance of abnormal returns 
A                                 B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C                                    D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures 1-3-A and 1-3-B show positive abnormal returns to the merging firm at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and    𝑡𝑡 = +1 over four estimation windows and three event windows. Figures 1-3-C and 1-3-D show the 
same for a rival firm. 
  
1.6.1. Merging firm’s industry 
Figure 1-3 (A to D) shows average changes in the statistical significance of abnormal returns to the 
merging firm and its rival. The significance levels show a concave pattern and are maximized at the 
200-day window. Thus, the 200-day estimation window is deemed most significant. We find that 
while the statistical significance levels of the ARs change over the four estimation windows, the 
event study of the merging industry is robust to all of the estimation windows. A detailed explanation 
of these results follows. 
At 𝑡𝑡 = 0, the AR to the merging firm (i.e., NKK) is significantly positive, with Kawasaki Steel 
being evaluated lower (negative but insignificant), and NKK being evaluated higher (positive and 
significant). Likewise, the AR to rival firms is significantly positive on average. Moreover, 
at 𝑡𝑡 = +1, the ARs to NKK and Kawasaki Steel are both significantly positive, and the AR to the 
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rival firms on average is also significantly positive. For the steel firms, the qualitative results are 
unchanged across the four estimation windows. 
Based on the findings of Eckbo (1983) and Shahrur (2005), this merger may be consistent with 
the collusion hypothesis. In other words, the gain resulting from the merger may come from the 
exertion of increased market power in the steel industry. So far, we have ignored the customer firms. 
Thus, in the next section, we examine the event study results for the customer firms.  
     
1.6.2. Customer firms’ industries  
Table 1-2 (A to D) provides a rough explanation of the results of the event study. It shows the 
significant ARs and their signs for firms in the customer industries (i.e., the steel-processing industry, 
auto industry, construction industry, and shipbuilding industry). However, it does not include the 
results for firms in the merging industry. As mentioned in Subsection 1.6.1, we observe that the ARs 
to all of the firms are significantly positive somewhere in the time interval (−1, +1), and the event 
study results are qualitatively consistent with the four estimation windows.10 Here, the statistical 
significance level is 10% when the t-value is more than 1.65, 5% when it is more than 1.96, and 1% 
when it is more than 2.58 in the standard normal distribution for abnormal returns. Some firms’ 
theoretical stock returns could not be explained well by the market model; thus, we do not compute 
the ARs to such firms.  
    The JFTC investigated the merger’s effect on the following four steel products: non-oriented 
electrical steel sheets (i.e., a type of steel sheet), steel plates for vessels (contained in steel plates), 
pipes and sheet tubes for piping (contained in steel pipe), and high-tensile-strength steel (contained 
in steel sheets for cars and steel plates for construction). These products are consumed by the 
customer industries studied in this paper. 
We were able to find statistically significant ARs only for a limited number of customer firms. 
Among these, the results were mixed between positive and negative ARs. Next, we examine the 
event study result, for each customer industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
10 Upon request, a detailed explanation of the results of the event study using other tables could be 
prepared. Table 1-2 shows the AR, CAR, and their statistical significance for each firm in the merging 
firms’ and customer firms’ industries, focusing on the interval of (−5, +5) in four event windows. 
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Figure 1-4: Monthly average price of steel sheets (Yen per Ton) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Market price, Japan Metal Daily 
 
1.6.2.1. Steel-processing industry 
This industry consumes pipes and sheet tubes for piping (contained in steel pipe) from steel blast 
furnace companies (i.e., the merging industry). At 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡 = +1, there are two firms, Toyo and 
Maruichi, for which we observe negative (but insignificant) ARs for the four estimation windows. 
However, as most of the steel-processing firms have positive ARs at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡 = +1 , albeit with 
low significance, their stock market value may be expected to increase around the announcement 
date. 
 
1.6.2.2. Auto industry  
This industry uses, as intermediates, non-oriented electrical steel sheets from steel blast furnace 
companies. We observe a positive sign for Hino’s ARs in the four estimation windows, but a 
negative sign for Daihatsu’s. 
One might wonder why the signs of the ARs would be different for these firms. First, let me 
explain the competition situation of vehicle markets. Daihatsu not only supplied consigned/OEM 
vehicles to Toyota, but also competed intensely with Suzuki in the small-size passenger vehicle 
market. Hino specializes in large-size commercial vehicles, including buses and trucks, and has 
maintained a top share and leading position in the market.11  
    I think the logic is as follows. The merger triggered a decrease in the average price of steel 
sheets as Figure 1-4 shows. Then, competition in the small-size passenger vehicle market became 
                                                   
11 Daihatsu has already been a consolidated subsidiary of Toyota since April 2001. At that time, Hino 
had also formed a business alliance with Toyota. See Daihatsu motor Co., Ltd. Annual Report 2001, and 
Toyota Motor Corporation. Global Website. 
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stronger while competition in the large-size commercial vehicle market did not increase so much.12 
Therefore, Daihatsu expected to gain lower profits while Hino expected to gain higher profits. This 
can be a reason why Daihatsu’s ARs are negative, while Hino’s are positive. 
Figure 1-4 shows changes in the prices of steel sheets. Japanese blast furnace steelmakers have 
a comparative advantage in steel sheets. Thus, the prices of steel sheets depend on the business 
strategies and technological progress of blast furnace steelmakers. We can observe decreases in the 
average price of steel sheets when the merger was announced. 
 
1.6.2.3. Shipbuilding industry  
This industry consumes steel plates for vessels (contained in steel plates) from the merger industry. 
For the 200-day and 150-day estimation windows, we found positive significant ARs at 𝑡𝑡 = +1 to 
two firms, Hitachi Shipbuilding and Sumitomo Heavy Industries.  
 
1.6.2.4. Construction industry 
This industry consumes high-tensile-strength steel from the merging industry. We found that only 
one firm, Taisei, has a significant and positive AR at  𝑡𝑡 = 0 for three estimation windows (i.e., 
200-day, 150-day, and 100-day) 
 
1.7. Robustness check 
So far, we have ignored if there are any extraordinary values for individual stock returns in 
estimation windows. If there are extraordinarily positive or negative returns in estimation windows, 
the estimated normal returns obtained by ignoring such extraordinary values can be different from 
those obtained by considering the extraordinary values. Hence, the result of testing ARs can be 
changed. This section briefly provides result by controlling the extraordinary values of stock returns. 
We observed the extraordinary values (peaks and bottoms), and made sure that the 
extraordinary values are accompanied with relevant events occurring within three days around the 
date in which extraordinary values are observed. Specifically, we observed extraordinary values to 
four firms in construction industry and one firm in auto industry. In construction industry, 
extraordinary values for Taisei are negative at   𝑡𝑡 = −241 and positive at   𝑡𝑡 = −240 , an 
extraordinary value for Shimizu is positive at   𝑡𝑡 = −240 , an extraordinary value for 
Sumitomo-Mitsui is negative at  𝑡𝑡 = −94, and an extraordinary value for Hasegawa is positive 
at  𝑡𝑡 = −91. In auto industry, an extraordinary value for Hino is positive at  𝑡𝑡 = −270.  
                                                   
12 By using data from METI (2001 and 2002), I observed a trend that monthly average sales unit prices of 
midget passenger vehicle were decreasing. However, monthly average sales unit prices of large trucks did 
not show such a decreasing trend. Upon request, I would prepare the result from the data. 
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To estimate normal returns again, regression model turns to following formula (1-8). We control 
the extraordinary values in stock return for firm  𝑖𝑖  in estimation window by dummy variable  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  . 
 
                       𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                       (1-8) 
 
A dummy variable takes   𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1  if   𝑡𝑡 ∈ {𝐸𝐸 − 1, 𝐸𝐸, 𝐸𝐸 + 1} or takes  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 0  otherwise, 
where  𝐸𝐸  is the event date in which the extraordinary values are observed. Following procedure 
above, we estimated normal returns and then tested ARs.   
Finally, we summarize this section. Dummy variables are statistically significant to estimate 
normal returns for each firm. Comparing the results before and after controlling extraordinary values 
by dummy variable, however, we could not find any different result about ARs in the event. 
Therefore, we leave to show the result before introducing dummy variable in this chapter. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
Using a conventional event study approach, we tested the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns to individual firms in order to forecast the economic effect of the NKK and Kawasaki Steel 
merger. Focusing on the merging industry, the event study result shows that this merger is 
anticompetitive. However, taking the industry’s customer firms into consideration, the merger may 
have had the opposite effect. Our results for the customer firms are as follows: We observed 
relatively more significant abnormal returns in the steel-processing industry than in the other three 
customer industries. For the auto industry, construction industry, and ship-building industry, there 
were fewer customer firms with significant abnormal returns. Regarding the signs of abnormal 
returns to customer firms, we observed both positive and negative abnormal returns around the 
merger announcement date along with a few significant abnormal returns. As shown in Table 1-1, the 
merger of NKK and Kawasaki Steel may have been for efficiency gains. 
    Based on the work of McAfee and Williams (1988), the event study examined in this paper 
showed no evidence that the merger was anticompetitive. As Shahrur (2005) suggests, if the 
abnormal returns to customer firms were, on average, positive and significant at the announcement 
date, then we can propose that the merger was expected to achieve efficiency improvements. 
The recent literature (e.g., Davis and Ormosi, 2012) argues that event studies are a useful way 
to evaluate mergers from the standpoint of competition policy. However, due to the stock market 
efficiency hypothesis, the value of event studies is still in question. This study does not engage in 
that debate; doing so would require improved data processing and better quantitative techniques. 
Moreover, future studies are recommended to investigate what happened after the merger in real 
terms (e.g., steel prices and steel production), rather than merely in financial terms. 
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Chapter 2 
Ownership structure of nuclear power plants for fair competition and 
efficiency: The NOME law versus public ownership 
2.1. Introduction  
In France, a vertically integrated incumbent power supplier, Électricité de France (EDF), exclusively 
owns the country’s nuclear power plants. Even after competition was introduced to the nuclear 
power generation and retail subsectors, the EDF continues to own its nuclear power plants, which 
are more cost efficient than thermal power plants. Thus, it has come to be recognized that 
competition has not been thriving in the electricity retail market, in spite of it being liberalized. To 
address this issue, in December 2010, the French Congress approved the “Nouvelle organization du 
marché de l’électricité” (New Organization for the Market of Electricity, NOME13) law, which 
contains “l’accés régulé à l’électricité nucléaire historique” (regulated access to incumbent nuclear 
electricity, ARENH 14 ). Under the ARENH, EDF is obliged to transfer about 25% of its 
nuclear-generated electricity capacity at marginal cost to other electricity suppliers. In other words, 
EDF is allowed to use 75% of its nuclear power capacity and is responsible for all fixed costs related 
to the nuclear power plants.  
Créti et al. (2013) undertook an economic analysis of the NOME law. Their study assumes that 
incumbent firm A owns nuclear power plants and entrant firm B owns thermal power plants. Neither 
firm supposedly has any capacity constraint. 𝐾𝐾(> 0) represents the transfer rights to sell nuclear 
power from firm A to firm B. If firm A sells nuclear power so as to match firm B’s market share 𝛼𝛼, 
firm B can use nuclear power for 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾, where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  denotes the quantity of electricity supplied by 
firm 𝑖𝑖 ( = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵). Otherwise, firm B switches to thermal power. The literature shows that under 
Cournot competition, the total quantity of power supplied increases owing to the NOME law. 
    Hence, Créti et al. (2013) found that it is good to introduce the NOME law and leave nuclear 
power plants in the hands of the incumbent. However, the authors did not consider an alternative 
policy that takes transfers nuclear power plants from the incumbent to a state company. Hence, we 
come to consider the issue of public ownership. If such a policy were employed and the marginal 
cost incurred by a market entrant were the same as that incurred by the incumbent, the market 
outcome could be improved. Therefore, in the current study, we compare the NOME law with public 
ownership to consider which policy is more desirable in terms of the performance of the electricity 
market. 
                                                   
13 Conseil de la Concurrence (2010) 
14 CRE (2011) 
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The ownership structure of nuclear power plants is under discussion in other countries as well 
as in France. In Japan, for example, following the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011, all 
operations of nuclear power plants stopped, and full liberalization of the Japanese electricity retail 
market is set to be completed in April 2016. If nuclear power plants were to come back online after 
2016, entrants with no nuclear power capacity would be at a clear disadvantage. Since, incumbents 
has been subsidized very much for nuclear power plants, nuclear power generation itself is not 
appropriate to liberalized electricity market. Moreover, in June 2014, one political party submitted a 
bill, unsuccessfully, to the Japanese Diet concerning the ownership structure of Japan’s nuclear 
power plants. This bill asserts that nuclear power plants should be owned by the state.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2.2 presents the framework of the 
model. In Section 2.3, we show the equilibrium without policy intervention as a benchmark scenario. 
In Section 2.4, we obtain the equilibria with and without capacity constraint, and with and without 
fixed cost of nuclear power plants under the second scenario of the NOME law. In Section 2.5, we 
obtain the corresponding equilibria under the third scenario of public ownership, and compare the 
welfare effects of the alternative policies. In Section 2.6, we consider a problem for an incumbent to 
approve the NOME law without political compromise rather than public ownership. Finally, we 
provide concluding remarks in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2. Model 
The current literature touches upon a number of issues pertaining to competition in the electricity 
market. Bushnell et al. (2008), using data from PJM Interconnection and California pertaining to the 
electricity market, studied the structure of the market, including spot transactions and forward 
contracts in which vertically integrated firms compete; they found Cournot competition in the retail 
market. For this reason, the current study makes use of the Cournot model. Allaz and Vila (1993) 
used a model that obtains equilibrium under a Cournot model while considering forward contracts. 
The current study, however, considers only spot transactions, so as to simplify our analysis. Our 
model is based on Dixit (1980)15 and Créti et al. (2013), both of which used the property of reaction 
functions that kink at different marginal costs. 
We assume that incumbent firm A and entrant firm B choose their respective quantities 
simultaneously, á la Cournot competition, in a duopolistic electricity market. Firm A owns nuclear 
power plants and firm B owns thermal power plants. While thermal power plants are assumed to 
have no capacity constraint, nuclear power plants may or may not have them. 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 and 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 are the 
marginal cost of nuclear power and thermal power, respectively; each is constant, and 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 < 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵. 
                                                   
15 Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) provide proper explanation for it.   
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We consider three scenarios. The first is a benchmark in which there is no policy intervention 
and firm A owns all the nuclear power plants. In the second scenario, under the NOME law, less than 
or equal to one-half of the capacity of nuclear power that firm A owns is transferred to firm B. Then, 
firm B can use nuclear power from that capacity, at the price of its marginal cost. Third, we examine 
a scenario in which all nuclear power plants are transferred from firm A to state firm U, which then 
sells nuclear power to firms A and B. In the second and third scenarios, we solve both models while 
assuming there either is or is not a capacity constraint on nuclear power plants; in addition, in both 
cases, we assume that there either are or are not fixed costs associated with nuclear power.  
 
2.3. Benchmark equilibrium 
First, we consider a market structure in which incumbent firm A owns all nuclear power plants, and 
firm B owns only thermal power plants. We consider this structure the benchmark, and we solve it 
under Cournot competition. 
    The inverse demand function 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) is assumed to be 𝑃𝑃′(𝑄𝑄) < 0 ,   𝑃𝑃′′(𝑄𝑄) ≤  0 and 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 < 1; in 
particular,𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) =  1 −𝑄𝑄. We represent 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 as the electricity quantity supplied by each firm to final 
consumers; then, 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵  .We define  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 as the profit function of firm 𝑖𝑖 (= 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) , and it is 
represented as  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖]𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 . Subscript 𝑖𝑖  represents firm  𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 . By solving the 
profit-maximization problem, we obtain best-response functions 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) for firm 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) 
as follows. 
 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖):𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2     (2-1) 
 
Solving both best-response functions simultaneously, we obtain quantities at Nash equilibrium 
defined as �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏�. Then, 
 
 
�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏� = �1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 , 1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3 � ,     𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 , + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏 . (2-2) 
 
In Figure 2-1, this gives point B.16 Defining (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛) as an equilibrium in which both firms supply 
                                                   
16 The Japan Electric Power Information Center reports domestic electricity supply share in France in 
2012 one year after the introduction of the NOME law. According to the report, EDF supplies 80% of the 
supplier share, and nuclear power supplies 75% in terms of generation share. According to data from 
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2014) in Japan, the proportion of nuclear-generated electricity 
in general power production in 2011 and 2012—after the Great East Japan Earthquake—was 10.7% and 
1.7%, respectively; however, before 2011, it was around 30%. 
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nuclear-generated electricity, we obtain 
 
 
This gives point N in Figure 2-1, and it is obvious that 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 <  𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛. For the sake of comparison, let us 
define (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ) as an equilibrium in which both firms supply thermal-generated electricity. 
 (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ) = �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 , 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 � ,      𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 . (2-4) 
 
This gives point T in Figure 2-1, and  𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 <  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 < 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛. 
Moreover, for the sake of consistency with later sections to aid comparability, let us focus on 
the case in which firm 𝐴𝐴 considers the fixed cost 𝐹𝐹(> 0) of the nuclear power plant. Then, firm 𝐴𝐴’s 
profit function is represented by  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖]𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐹𝐹 . In firm 𝐴𝐴’s maximization problem, 
however, the fixed cost does not affect the firm, and the result is the same as before. 
 
2.4. Equilibria under the NOME law 
In this section, we consider the effect of the NOME law. Specifically, we assume a policy in which 
incumbent firm A sells a portion of its nuclear power to entrant firm B at marginal cost. First, we 
examine the case under no capacity constraint to nuclear power. Next, we do so under capacity 
constraint. Finally, we analyze the model by taking account of not only capacity constraint but also 
the fixed cost of nuclear power plants. 
 
2.4.1. Equilibria without capacity constraint   
In this subsection, we assume that there is no capacity constraint with regard to nuclear power, 
following Créti et al. (2013), and show that the NOME law is effective in terms of expanding the 
total quantity supplied to the retail electricity market. The profit function of firms A and B can be 
given as follows. 
    
 𝐾𝐾(> 0) is the nuclear-power capacity (transfer rights) of firm A that can be transferred to firm B at 
marginal cost. However, nuclear power itself is not supposed to be bound by a capacity constraint. 
 (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛) = �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3 , 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3 � ,      𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛, + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛. (2-3) 
 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄)− 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (2-5) 
 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = �[𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄)− 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵                                    if   𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄)− 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + [𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾           otherwise  (2-6) 
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Nuclear power is transferred to firm B in a ratio of 𝛼𝛼 , where ∀𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0, 1/2]—a ratio that is assumed 
to be exogenous in the current study. Thus, firm B actually uses nuclear power by 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾.17 
    While the best-response function of firm A is the same as that in benchmark, the best-response 
function of firm B can take one of two forms, depending how much nuclear power the firms uses. 
We do so, for the following reason. When  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾, firm B maximizes its profit, by using only 
nuclear power. On the other hand, when  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 > 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾, firm B maximizes its profit, by using thermal 
power, as the quantity of nuclear power is given (i.e., because it is has already finished using nuclear 
power). 
    Then, the best-response functions for firm A can be obtained as follows. 
 
 
In addition, the best-response functions for firm B can be obtained as follows. 
 
For the best-response functions for firm B, 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) is one when  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 , and 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵) is one 
when 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 > 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾. These three functions are found in Figure 2-1. 
Let  (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴∗ ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵∗ ) be the equilibrium quantities when the NOME law is in effect. We consider two 
extreme cases. In one, point N marks an equilibrium when 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2 , and in another, point B marks 
an equilibrium when 𝛼𝛼 = 0 . The arrow from point B to point N in Figure 2-1 shows that equilibrium 
moves from point B to point N as 𝛼𝛼 becomes large, given constant K. Note that neither quantity 
supplied by firm B nor total quantities increase; regardless of whether the regulator increases 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
more than the quantity supplied by firm B at equilibrium point B. This result is similar to that of 
Créti et al. (2013).  
 
 
                                                   
17 Créti et al. (2013) studied 𝛼𝛼, which represents the market share of firm B under both exogenous and 
endogenous conditions, in which 𝛼𝛼 = 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)⁄ . In Subsection 2.4.1, we recreate the model under 
conditions in which 𝛼𝛼 is exogenous. 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴):𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2  (2-7) 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴):𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2  if   1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 < 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 
(2-8) 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾):𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾  if    1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵):𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2    if    𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 < 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
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2.4.2. Equilibria with capacity constraint 
In Subsection 2.4.1, firm A was assumed to be able to supply all electricity by nuclear power. 
However, nuclear power actually faces a capacity constraint, and so, an incumbent firm uses not 
only nuclear power but also thermal power. In this subsection, we assume there is a capacity 
constraint to nuclear power. The profit function of firms A and B are given as follows.  
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �[𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴                                             if   𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 ≤ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄)− 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + [𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴](1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾                otherwise  , (2-9) 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = �[𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵                                    if   𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + [𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾           otherwise , (2-10) 
 
Assuming that firm A transfers less than one-half the nuclear-generated power it owns, we say that 
∀𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 1/2]. The best-response functions of firms A and B are obtained as follows. 
 
and 
 
The best-response function of firm 𝑖𝑖 (= 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) is 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) or 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵), depending on the marginal 
cost and whether the power is generated by nuclear or thermal. Then, we obtain the kinked 
best-response function as we showed in Subsection 2.4.1 
Given  𝐾𝐾  is constant, in choosing 𝛼𝛼 , the intersections of two kinked response functions  are 
determined simultaneously. Let the intersections be ( 𝑞𝑞�𝐴𝐴,𝑞𝑞�𝐵𝐵). If we assume  𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 , an equilibrium 
of (𝑞𝑞�A, 𝑞𝑞�𝐵𝐵) is realized at any point on the line where there is a downward −1 degree and point B 
(i.e., �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏� as one of the sides on the line). The line is described as  
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴):𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2  if   1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 < 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵   
(2-11) 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾):𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 if    1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵):𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2    if    𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 < 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴):𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2  if   1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 < 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 
(2-12) 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾):𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾  if    1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵):𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2    if    𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 < 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
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𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3   subject to   𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴.     (2-13) 
 
The equilibrium is equal to �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏� when 𝛼𝛼 = 0; and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, it is equal to (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ), as 
follows.  (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ) = �2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵6 , 2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵6 � ,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠  (2-14) 
 
Notice that 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 . In Figure 2-2, (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ) is shown as point S. The equilibrium is realized on the 
line between B and S, depending on the size of 𝛼𝛼 . 
    Under the NOME law, when comparing a case with capacity constraint to one without it, both 
similar and divergent features are found. For similar features, the quantity supplied by firm B 
increases, as it does in the case with no capacity constraint. This happens because the nuclear power 
transferred from firm A to firm B increases when 𝛼𝛼 becomes large. For divergent features, the 
increase in quantity supplied by firm B is restrained compared to the case with no capacity constraint. 
The total quantity is constant at  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. However, the quantities for both firms will equalize; the reason 
is that the composition of electrical source for each firm becomes identical. Summarizing this 
subsection, when we consider the effect of the NOME law taking account of capacity constraint, we 
can see that the law results in only surplus transfer between firms, but not an increase in total 
quantity if we assume 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏  which is one case of the size of capacity constraint.  
The reason of assuming  𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏  is, first, derived from the fact that the NOME law was 
introduced not to shrink but to expand the downstream output, and second, that it is easy to handle 
and see what happens under capacity constraint on Figure 2-2. Instead if we assume 𝐾𝐾 ∈ (𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛), 
the equilibrium would be realized on a line that starts from point B to the intersection 
of  𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  and the  𝐾𝐾  line with downward  45° slope for a while. After that, the equilibrium would 
be realized on the 𝐾𝐾  line and would end up with a symmetric point between point T and point N. 
The larger capacity constraint which assumed alternatively shows that the NOME law expands the 
downstream output. If you are interested in the result of analysis by assuming  𝐾𝐾 ∈ (𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛), see 
Supplementary Analysis in Appendix.   
 
2.4.3. Equilibria under fixed costs of nuclear power plant 
As in Subsection 2.4.2, we suppose in this subsection that there is a capacity constraint on nuclear 
power plants. Moreover, we assume that firm A considers the fixed costs of nuclear power plants, so 
that firm A’s profit function is represented as 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹 . Although firm A takes into 
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account its own profit, under the NOME law, electricity is sold to firm B at marginal cost. This 
additional assumption does not affect the behavior of firm A, based on the maximization principle. 
The results are the same as those discussed in Subsection 2.4.2. Note that it requires a condition that 
the fixed cost is not as large as firm A’s profit would be negative: 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0. 
 
2.5. Equilibrium under public ownership 
In Section 2.4, we examined the effect of the NOME law which is aim for improving the equilibrium 
under benchmark. The results show that the total quantities are the same as in the benchmark and do 
not expand when we take account of capacity constraint with even fixed costs, while total quantities 
expand when we do not take account of it. However, point B at the equilibrium is not good because it 
does not ensure fair competition between the incumbent and the entrant. For example, the incumbent 
might deal with the entrant unfairly when it sells nuclear power. Thus, we consider taking all nuclear 
power plants out of the hands of the incumbent.  
In this section, suppose that the ownership of all nuclear power plants is transferred from firm A 
to another firm, state firm U. Then, firms A and B can buy nuclear power from state firm U and 
supply the thermal power electricity that they themselves generated. In addition, it is assumed that 
firms A and B use the same amount of nuclear power, and that a symmetrical equilibrium is realized. 
Like in Section 2.4, we consider three cases: with and without capacity constraint of nuclear power, 
and with capacity constraint and fixed costs. It is assumed that the public firm U sells electricity to 
firm A and firm B by arm’s lengths transaction. This assumption comes from that the wholesale 
electricity price can rise sharply under the market transaction.  
 
2.5.1. Equilibrium without capacity constraint 
To compare the results in this subsection with the effects of the NOME law in Subsection 2.4.1, we 
solve for equilibrium, which is realized under public ownership without capacity constraint. We 
define 𝜋𝜋𝑈𝑈 as the profit function of state firm U, and express 𝜋𝜋𝑈𝑈 and 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) as follows. 
 
 
where 𝑤𝑤 and 𝐾𝐾 are each the wholesale price of nuclear power and the quantity of nuclear power 
chosen by state firm U, respectively. State firm U chooses K, subject not to profit maximization but 
to balancing its earnings and expenses; here the balancing condition 𝑤𝑤𝐾𝐾 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 comes into play. 
State firm U sets a wholesale price of 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴, and supplies nuclear power quantity K corresponding 
to demands by firm A and B. Hence, firms A and B choose their quantities in the retail electricity 
 𝜋𝜋𝑈𝑈 = [𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝐾𝐾                    (2-15) 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄)−𝑤𝑤]𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖               (2-16) 
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market as 𝑤𝑤 is given. 
    The best-response functions for firm 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) are, 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴):𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2 , (2-17) 
 
respectively. In solving these equations simultaneously, we obtain  
 (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛) = �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3 , 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3 �  .  𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛.     (2-18) 
 
This equilibrium is showed at point N in Figure 2-3. The market-clearing condition of wholesale is  𝐾𝐾 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵  . By substituting 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛 = 2 �1−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3 �into the market-clearing condition,𝐾𝐾∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛. 
This means that state firm U can supply to firms A and B as much nuclear power electricity as they 
request. 
    We summarize this subsection by comparing its results to those of Subsection 2.4.1. The 
equilibrium obtained in the current subsection—which considers no capacity constraint on the 
nuclear power plant—is identical to that obtained in Subsection 2.4.1 (i.e., point N in Figure 2-2). 
Note that, in Subsection 2.4.1, the equilibrium of point N is achieved only if some actor—for 
example, a regulator—intervenes and makes 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2 . However, in the current subsection, the 
equilibrium of point N is achieved autonomously, in the absence of any intervention. Therefore, in 
comparing the results under the NOME law and those under public ownership, when we do not 
consider the capacity constraint applied to nuclear power, public ownership appears to be a policy 
superior to the NOME law. 
 
2.5.2. Equilibrium with capacity constraint 
In Subsection 2.5.1, we assumed that there is no capacity constraint with regard to nuclear power, 
and thus, firms A and B utilized only nuclear power to supply the retail electricity market. Here, like 
in Subsection 2.4.2, we examine the case of nuclear capacity constraint. We express 𝜋𝜋𝑈𝑈 and 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖 =
𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) as follows. 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑈𝑈 = [𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝐾𝐾 (2-19) 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = � [𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) −𝑤𝑤]𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖                               if     𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖[𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑤𝑤 + [𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖      otherwise     (2-20) 
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We assume that 𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴 + 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 = 𝐾𝐾 is completed. Likewise, in Subsection 2.5.1, we obtain the 
best-response functions for firm 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵),  
 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴):𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2        
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵):𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = −12 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 + 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2    ,         (2-21) 
 
respectively. When the nuclear power capacity is sufficiently large, 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 ≤ 𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴 ∧ 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 ⟹  𝑄𝑄 ≤ 𝐾𝐾, 
the best-response functions of firms A and B are 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) and 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴), and we obtain equilibrium 
at point N—that is, (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛). On the other hand, let us consider when there is a capacity 
constraint,𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 > 𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴 ∧ 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 > 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 ⟹  𝑄𝑄 > 𝐾𝐾 . While the best-response function for firm  𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 (𝑖𝑖 =
𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) follows 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) when 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 is large, thereafter, the function kinks and follows 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵) when 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 is small. As Figure 2-3 shows, the equilibria exist on the intermediate between point T point and 
the N points.  
To compare two different policies, we assume that capacity K is as large under the NOME law. 
Then, we can solve the problem under public ownership taking account of the capacity constraint by 
assuming that the capacity is 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ,∀𝑖𝑖 by means of firm symmetry. 
In this case, equilibrium is realized at point S. State firm U chooses its quantity subject for 
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴, like in Subsection 2.5.1; however, because there is a capacity constraint such that 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛, 
state firm U actually chooses 𝐾𝐾∗, such that  
 
𝐾𝐾∗ < 2(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)3  (2-22) 
 
This 𝐾𝐾∗ is due to there being a capacity constraint on nuclear power. As a result, neither firm A nor 
B can use much nuclear power and instead, they use thermal power, which has a comparatively 
higher marginal cost. Thus, the total quantities supplied to the market decrease. 
Finally, we compare the results of Subsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. In Subsection 2.5.1, because we 
do not consider a capacity constraint for nuclear power, regardless of the intervention of the 
regulator, the equilibrium is achieved at point N. In Subsection 2.5.2, on the other hand, because we 
consider a capacity constraint, the equilibrium is never achieved at point N. Thus, the total quantities 
of electricity at the equilibrium are smaller for the case in which we consider a capacity constraint. 
Comparing the results of Subsections 2.4.2 and 2.5.2, the total quantities of electricity are obviously 
identical. However, taking account of the producer surplus for each firm, the market equilibrium is 
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realized at point S where producer surpluses for each firm are identical to those in Subsection 2.5.2, 
while the producer surplus is never identical between firms regardless of whether regulator 
sets  𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, as in Subsection 2.4.2. Thus, it matters how much surplus loss the incumbent firm can 
approve when the regulator exercises the NOME law compared with the benchmark case. We 
discuss this topic in Section 2.6. 
 
2.5.3. Equilibrium with fixed cost of nuclear power plant 
As explained in Subsection 2.4.3, when nuclear power plants are held by firm A, which maximizes 
its profit, fixed costs does not affect the result. However, assuming that state firm U is subject to a 
balancing condition, we expect that the fixed costs do affect the result. In this subsection, we 
suppose that there is a capacity constraint for nuclear power, like in Subsection 2.5.2; however, we 
introduce 𝐹𝐹 > 0 , or the fixed cost of nuclear power plants for state firm U. Then, the profit function 
of state firm U is redefined as 
  𝜋𝜋𝑈𝑈 = [𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝐾𝐾 − 𝐹𝐹 . (2-23) 
 
Solving the problem of state firm U subject to the balancing condition obviously expresses 
 
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾  . (2-24) 
 
As we can see in Equation (2-24), the wholesale price 𝑤𝑤 is equal to the average cost. We define 𝑟𝑟 as 
the wholesale price based on the average cost. In comparing 𝑟𝑟 to the wholesale price—in which the 
fixed costs are ignored—then 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 .Then,  
 
𝑟𝑟 > 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 . (2-25) 
 
When 𝑟𝑟 is applied to this model, the best-response function for firm 𝑖𝑖(= 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) shifts downward, 
from 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) to 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟). Suppose that 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟) is upward from 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵) and downward from 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴). An equilibrium to be realized there would be conditional on the size of average cost (𝑟𝑟) 
determined by the size of fixed cost (𝐹𝐹). 
    Specifically, we assume that 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 and increase 𝑟𝑟. Then, the larger  𝑟𝑟 becomes, the closer 
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟) gets to 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵). According to this, the intersection of kinked best-response functions is to 
be equivalent ultimately to the intersection point R of 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑟𝑟) and 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑟𝑟); that is, equilibrium 
moves closer to point T as 𝑟𝑟 increases, while it moves closer to point S as 𝑟𝑟 decreases. Point S is 
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an identical equilibrium under the NOME law as 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2 taking account of the nuclear power 
capacity constraint.  
    By means of the property that brings such an equilibrium, we can construct the condition that 
an equilibrium under the NOME law is better (realized in the outer parts of Figure 2-3) than one 
under public ownership, as follows. 
 
Condition:  
The wholesale price 𝑟𝑟 , which is based on the average cost, should be large and proximate to 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵. 
 
Specifically, we show a proof that for the extent to which 𝑟𝑟 makes equilibrium quantity under the 
NOME law larger than one under public ownership. Let us assume that the average cost of nuclear 
power becomes higher since its fixed cost increases. We then consider the case in which the 
wholesale price—based on the average cost principle—is higher; assuming that 𝑟𝑟 > 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 holds.18 
Note that we can consider the case in which average cost increases as fixed cost increases because 
fixed cost is independent of capacity.19 Defining 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 as equilibrium quantity for firm 𝑖𝑖 when 𝑟𝑟 is 
applied, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 is identical to the intersection of kinked best-response functions. Note that the capacity 
constraint is fixed to 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 , ∀𝑖𝑖 and best-response functions kink at 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, ∀𝑖𝑖, then the intersection of the 
kinked best-response functions would be equivalent to point S when 𝑟𝑟 is small, while it would be 
equivalent to the intersection of 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑟𝑟) and 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑟𝑟) when 𝑟𝑟 is large. Then, taking 𝑟𝑟 ≡ 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾 
into account for 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 1−𝑟𝑟3 , this becomes  
 
(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 ,𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟) = �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾3 , 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾3 � (2-26) 
 
Next, we consider the condition that satisfies  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠. Then,  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠  1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾3 ≤ 2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵6   
                                                   
18 We suppose in the current study that the fixed cost 𝐹𝐹 is independent of the capacity constraint 𝐾𝐾 . 
Some might say that 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾). Even if we assume that the fixed cost is a function of capacity size, we 
can consider a situation in which the average cost increases when we suppose decreasing returns to scale, 
as the increase in capacity size is smaller compared with the increase in the fixed cost. However, if the 
function has constant returns to scale, the average cost would be constant, and the position at which the 
best-response functions kink would not change when the fixed cost increases.  
19 From the viewpoint of installed generation capacity, the ratio of nuclear power is 18.7%. In the past, 
this figure has been lower than 20%. 
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𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 ≤ 2 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾 (2-27) 
 
This inequality is the condition such that total quantity at equilibrium under the NOME law is equal 
to/larger than that under public ownership. As far as the inequality is satisfied at equilibrium, point R 
is realized inside the area, including point S.  
    Finally, some might say that no policy is needed because total quantities are identical between 
points B and S. To address this claim, we should be reminded of our starting point to create a policy. 
The reason why point B is not good is that the incumbent exclusively holds cost-efficient nuclear 
power plants, which undermines fair competition under a liberalized market. We can ascertain that 
social welfare is identical between points B and S in terms of efficiency, while point S is better than 
point B in terms of fairness. However, we can also consider that social welfare is not fair, because 
the entrant’s profit at equilibrium point S is created at the expense of the incumbent’s profit. In 
Section 2.6, we seek equilibria relevant to practice by also taking account of the incumbent’s 
interests.  
 
2.6. Comparison of approvable NOME law and public ownership 
So far, we have compared the NOME law, or transfer of nuclear power at marginal cost in general, 
with public ownership in terms of a social optimum. As a result, we showed that the NOME law is 
better than public ownership. Hence, it is reasonable for a regulator to exercise the NOME law. On 
the other hand, the incumbent usually resists the reform of nuclear power plants. However, it may 
embrace the NOME law if political pressure forces the incumbent to accept either the NOME law or 
public ownership. The incumbent would accept the NOME law as a political compromise, if it is 
more profitable. In this section, we discuss under which condition of the transfer right 𝛼𝛼 it is better 
for the incumbent to approve the NOME law .  
For a preliminary step, we first obtain firm A’s profit at equilibrium under the NOME law and 
public ownership, and compare these profits. Thereafter, we define firm A’s equilibrium profit as a 
function of 𝛼𝛼, and find significant 𝛼𝛼∗ such that firm A would approve the NOME law.  
The incumbent firm A, under the NOME law, is able to utilize nuclear power at marginal cost, while 
it has to pay all the fixed cost of the nuclear power plants. On the other hand, firm A, under public 
ownership, is able to utilize nuclear power at average cost, while it does not pay the fixed cost. Thus, 
although firm A’s equilibrium quantity under the NOME law is larger than under public ownership, 
its profit under public ownership could be smaller than that under the NOME law.  
Let 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠). Defining firm A’s equilibrium profit under the benchmark as 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏, it is 
represented by 
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The equilibrium of the benchmark is the same as that under the NOME law with 𝛼𝛼 = 0. Next, we 
consider the equilibrium under the NOME law with 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, where total quantities and firm A’s 
quantity are 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 and 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  at point S, respectively. Defining firm A’s equilibrium profit in this case 
as 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠, which is represented by 
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − �𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 + 𝐹𝐹� − cB �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 �  
 = [𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝐹𝐹  
 = �1 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 ��2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵6 � + �𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2 ��1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 � − 𝐹𝐹 (2-29) 
 = 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0  
It is assumed that a non-negative condition is imposed on the equilibrium profit 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 . Finally, we 
focus on point R under public ownership equaling point S, which is the equilibrium under the NOME 
law with 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2 . By doing so, we can easily compare profits at equilibria under the different 
policies. Correspondingly, let a condition be 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 . Consequently, we apply (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)/2 = 𝑟𝑟 ⇒
𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 = 2(𝐹𝐹/𝐾𝐾) upon analysis. In addition, we assume 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏20. Defining firm A’s profit at the 
equilibrium of point R (= point S) under public ownership as 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟, it is represented by 
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − �𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 �  
 = [𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2   
 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹 − 𝐹𝐹 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2  (2-30) 
 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹2  
                                                   
20 When we assume 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏, it will have 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 < 0. Then the result in this section would not be 
maintained. 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏 = [𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝐹𝐹  
 = �1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 �2 − 𝐹𝐹 (2-28) 
 = �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏�2 − 𝐹𝐹  
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Let us compare these profits. First, comparing profits at points B and S,  
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑠𝑠 = ��𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏�2 − 𝐹𝐹� − �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏 − 𝐹𝐹�  
 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏) > 0 (2-31) 
 
Thus, we find 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠. Next, comparing profits at points R and S,  
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑟𝑟 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑠𝑠 = �𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹2� − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  
 = 𝐹𝐹2 > 0. (2-32) 
 
Thus, we find  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠. Finally, comparing profits at points B and R, 
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑟𝑟 = ��𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏�2 − 𝐹𝐹� − �𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹2�  
 = ��𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏�2 − 𝐹𝐹2� − �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏�  
 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏) − 𝐹𝐹2  
 = �1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 − 2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵6 � �2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3  � − 𝐹𝐹2 (2-33) 
 = (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)(2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)6 − 𝐹𝐹2  
 
Now, we assume for firm A that the total cost of nuclear power is cheaper than that of thermal power 
at the benchmark equilibrium:21 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 > 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹 . Then, Equation (2-33) continues as follows. 
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑟𝑟 = (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)(2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)6 − 𝐹𝐹2  
                                                   
21 In our model, firm A possesses both nuclear and thermal power. At the benchmark equilibrium, firm A 
supplies electricity only by means of nuclear power. Hence, the total cost of nuclear power must be 
cheaper than that of thermal power. This is the reason we assume inequality regarding total costs. 
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 > (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)(2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)6 − (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2   
 = (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)(2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)6 − �𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2 ��1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 �  
 = (1 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)6(2− 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵) > 0 (2-33) 
 
Thus, we find that 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟. 
    In addition, we can identify the sign of 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 by means of another methodology. First, we 
decompose 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟  into(𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋�𝐴𝐴) + (𝜋𝜋�𝐴𝐴 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟), where 𝜋𝜋�𝐴𝐴 is counterfactual profit for firm A. 
This is defined as firms A’s equilibrium profit earned if firm A provides the benchmark equilibrium 
quantity by means of both nuclear and thermal power; the counterfactual profit is represented by 
 
𝜋𝜋�𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝐹𝐹2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2  (2-34) 
and 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠). Here, we assume that nuclear power plants are owned by a state firm (i.e., 
public ownership); then, firm A supplies electricity by means of both types of generation. As 
mentioned, we assume 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 > 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 as well. Next, we check the signs of two 
equations as follows. 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋�𝐴𝐴 = [𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝐹𝐹 − �𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝐹𝐹2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 �  
 = 12 �(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝐹𝐹� > 0 (2-35) 
and  𝜋𝜋�𝐴𝐴 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = �𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝐹𝐹2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 � − 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − �𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 �  
 = (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)(𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵) > 0 (2-36) 
 
Thus, we can show that 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 > 0. Moreover, by representing 𝑃𝑃, 𝑞𝑞𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏, and 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  as parameters,, 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑟𝑟 = (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)(2−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴−𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)
6
−
𝐹𝐹
2
, which is identical to Equation (2-34). 
     All the above mentioned results are from comparing equilibrium profits for firm A. Next, we 
formulate the equilibrium profit for firm A as a function of the transfer ratio 𝛼𝛼, and find a range of 
𝛼𝛼 such that firm A prefers the NOME law to public ownership. Defining the equilibrium profit as 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼), and applying 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)/2, then,  
  
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)� − �[(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝐹𝐹�, (2-37) 
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where ∀𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 1/2] . We compare 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) under the NOME law and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 under public ownership 
at point S. We consider the difference between 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) and  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟,  
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)� − �[(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵]𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝐹𝐹� − �𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹2� 
 
(2-38) 
 
This equation appears like a figure when taking 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 on the vertical axis, and 𝛼𝛼 on the 
horizontal axis. Our interest is to find 𝛼𝛼∗ such that 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) ≥ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟. Taking account of  
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑠𝑠 = [𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵] �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2 � + (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2 − 𝐹𝐹2, we compute as follows. 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼) ≥ 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟  2𝛼𝛼(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)�𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏� ≤ (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)�𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏� − 𝐹𝐹  
𝛼𝛼 ≤ 
12 �1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)(𝑃𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏)�  
𝛼𝛼 ≤ 
12 �1 − 𝐹𝐹2(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 )� (2-39) 
 
Applying  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2  to  (𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 > 𝐹𝐹 , it becomes 2�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 > 𝐹𝐹 . Considering this 
inequality, Equation (2-39) is  
 
𝛼𝛼 ≤ 
12 �1 −  2�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏2(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 )� < 12 �1 − 𝐹𝐹2(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠)(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 )�. (2-40) 
Consequently,  
𝛼𝛼 ≤ 
12 �1 −  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠�  
 
= 
12 �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �  
 
= 
12 �𝑄𝑄∗ − 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄∗ �  
𝛼𝛼∗ ≤ 
12 � 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄∗� (2-41) 
 
We express 𝑄𝑄∗(= 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠) , because total quantities of electricity at equilibrium points B and 
S are identical. This is the general expression of 𝛼𝛼∗. 
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    Specifically, we use an estimate of the marginal cost of generation and show a numerical 
example; Taking account of the estimation derived from Cabinet Office of Japan (2011)22, we 
assume 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 = 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴.We substitute this relationship in the fourth equation of (2-41), we obtain 
 
𝛼𝛼∗ ≤ 
12 �1 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 � = 12 �1 − 3𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2 − 3𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴� ≡ 𝑍𝑍(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴). (2-42) 
 
We can see that 𝛼𝛼∗ is decreasing in 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴. Numerically, it is shown that 𝛼𝛼∗ ≈ 0.05 when 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 = 0.3, 
𝛼𝛼∗ ≈ 0.15 when 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 = 0.2 , 𝛼𝛼∗ ≈ 0.2 when 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 = 0.1, and 𝛼𝛼∗ = 0.25 when 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 = 0 . Taking a 
limit for 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴,  
𝛼𝛼∗ ≤ lim𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴→0𝑍𝑍(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) = 12 �12� = 0.25. (2-43) 
 
The threshold 𝛼𝛼∗ would never be larger than 0.25, hence, 𝛼𝛼∗(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴) ∈ (0, 1/4] depending on 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴. 
Interestingly, the NOME law in France actually sets the transfer ratio at 0. 25, which is relevant to 
our result drawn by numerical example. 
    We can summarize the results from comparing firm A’s profits at each equilibrium. The 
equilibrium profit under the benchmark case or a non-effective NOME law(𝛼𝛼 = 0) is larger than 
that under the most effective NOME law (𝛼𝛼 = 1/2); Firm A’s equilibrium profit decreases as 𝛼𝛼 
increases. Ultimately, when 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, the equilibrium profit would be smaller than that gained under 
the most effective public ownership; in the sense that the total quantity of electricity at the 
equilibrium is equivalent to that under the NOME law when 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2.  
    From the numerical example, we also learn how crucial the transfer ratio is. Assuming the 
marginal cost of nuclear power is approximately zero, if 𝛼𝛼∗ ≤ 1/4, an incumbent is able to gain 
more profit under the NOME law, otherwise the incumbent is able to gain more profit under public 
ownership. When we assume that the marginal cost of nuclear power is larger, the threshold 𝛼𝛼∗ 
would be lower. In terms of regulatory practice, setting the transfer ratio at α∗ ≤ 1/4 would make 
the NOME law not only socially optimal but also approvable by an incumbent firm.  
 
 
                                                   
22 Due to the inability to obtain the estimation of marginal cost of thermal power in France, we instead 
use the estimation of generation costs in Japan. From the estimation derived during the cost investigation 
commission in the Cabinet Office of Japan (2011), while the marginal cost of nuclear power is 50% of 
that of thermal power, the average cost of nuclear power is 80% of the marginal cost of thermal power. 
Additionally, from the estimation derived during the summary of the public thematic report by the Cour 
des Comptes (2012) in France, while the wholesale price of nuclear power energy is €42/MWh, the 
current economic cost of nuclear power energy is €49.5/MWh.  
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2.7. Conclusion 
This research studied ownership structure of nuclear power plants in terms of efficiency; more 
specifically, we compared the NOME law and public ownership. Recently, Créti et al. (2013) 
showed that employing the NOME law would bring about larger quantities of power than before. We 
first set up a simple model, as well as the model used in Créti et al. (2013), and then compared the 
NOME law and public ownership. As a result of that comparison, we found that the quantity of 
electricity under public ownership is larger than that under the NOME law. Thus far, it appears that 
public ownership is superior to the NOME law.  
Next, we arranged the model so as to more closely approximate reality: in line with this, we 
considered capacity constraint and fixed costs with regard to nuclear power plants. We found that 
depending on the presence of condition on fixed costs, either the NOME law or public ownership 
becomes preferable to the other. The public ownership of nuclear power plants appears to be a fair 
policy tool; however, in selling nuclear-generated power, public ownership does embrace the 
average cost principle. Therefore, the effect of public ownership on outcome in the electricity retail 
market would be weaker than that under the NOME law, on account of the aforementioned 
conditions: fixed cost for nuclear power plants. The NOME law has economic significance than does 
any proposed political compromise that the incumbent prefers public ownership to the NOME law. 
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Figure 2-1: Equilibrium under benchmark and the NOME law without capacity constraint 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Equilibrium under the NOME law with capacity constraint, 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. 
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Figure 2-3: Equilibria under public ownership with capacity constraint and fixed cost 
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Appendix: Supplementary analysis 
 
In Chapter 2, we obtained main result of Subsection 2.4.2 by assuming 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 . This appendix 
provides the result of analysis by assuming  𝐾𝐾 ∈ [𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛). 
First, we solve for a threshold  𝛼𝛼∗  that the best-response function of firm A subject to lower 
marginal cost,  𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks effectively by transferring nuclear power by  𝛼𝛼 from firm A to firm B. 
Before solving for  𝛼𝛼∗ , we explain kinking points on best response functions for each firm. For firm 
A, 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks at   𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 and 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)  kinks at  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 −2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 . For firm B, 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks at   𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾  and  𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵)  kinks 
at  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾. As we can see Figure 2-4-A and 2-4-B, if  𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks effectively, 
the following inequality holds.  
 
𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) > 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 > 1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3  1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 > (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 
Solving for  𝛼𝛼  ,  
𝛼𝛼 > 1 − �1 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3𝐾𝐾 � ≡ 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾) (A-1) 
 
The condition for non-negative  𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾)  is that  𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾) ≥ 0  if   𝐾𝐾 ≥ 1−2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴+𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵
3
 , which is rewritten 
to   𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾) ≥ 0  if   𝐾𝐾 ≥ 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 . What the inequality (A-1) tells that if   𝛼𝛼 > 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾) , 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks 
effectively. Figure 2-4-A shows that 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks ineffectively; (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾′ = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏  for  𝐾𝐾′ > 𝐾𝐾 =
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 . In contrast, Figure 2-4-B shows that  𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kinks effectively;  (1 − 𝛼𝛼′)𝐾𝐾′ < 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏   for  𝛼𝛼′ > 𝛼𝛼 . 
As Figure 2-5 shows, the threshold becomes higher as the capacity constraint becomes larger such 
that 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾′) > 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾)  for  𝐾𝐾′ > 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. Therefore, it requires higher transfer ratio  𝛼𝛼′ > 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾′) >
𝛼𝛼  to make 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴)  kink effectively.  
Capacity constraint and transfer ratio affect best response function for each firm as follow. For 
firm A, its kinked best response function shifts down when capacity constraint becomes larger 
than  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 given 𝛼𝛼 > 0  constant, but it shift up when transfer ratio becomes higher than before. For 
firm B, its kinked best response function shifts leftward either when capacity constraint becomes 
larger or transfer ratio becomes higher; 𝐾𝐾′ > 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 or  𝛼𝛼′ > 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾′).   
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Next, we explain how total output changes as  𝛼𝛼  becomes higher under  𝐾𝐾 ∈ [𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛). As we 
can see Figure 2-4-C, an intersection on kinked best response functions for each firm exists 
upon  𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴,𝐾𝐾) ∶ 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 = −𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝐾𝐾  when the following equality holds. 
  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≥ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 ≥ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
 
Solving for  𝛼𝛼  , 
 
 
 
The condition for non-negative  𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾)  is that  𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾) ≥ 0  if   𝐾𝐾 ≥ 1−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴
2
. This condition is 
interpreted that capacity of nuclear power has to be more than or equal to monopolistic supply by 
means of nuclear power. What the inequality (A-2) tells that if  𝛼𝛼 > 𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾), total output at 
equilibrium just equals to the capacity of nuclear power. As   𝐾𝐾  becomes larger, the 
threshold  𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾)  becomes higher. It is easy to understand the inequality (A-2) by comparing what 
each of Figure 2-4s illustrates. Figure 2-4-A shows that total output at the equilibrium exists in the 
area inside  𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴,𝐾𝐾′)  under 𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾′) > 𝛼𝛼. Figure 2-4-B shows that total output at the equilibrium 
exists upon  𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴,𝐾𝐾′)  under 𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾′) = 𝛼𝛼′ > 𝛼𝛼. Either does Figure 2-4-C under 𝛼𝛼′ > 𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾′) > 𝛼𝛼.  
Finally, we show that   
 
𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾) ≥ 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾)  if    𝐾𝐾 ≥ 2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏   (A-3) 
 
As  𝐾𝐾  becomes larger than  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, the transfer ratio when consumes nuclear power becomes large after 
best response function for firm A kinks effectively. Specifically, substituting  𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 2−𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴−𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵
3
  to 
the inequality (A-1) and (A-2), they turn to 
 
𝛼𝛼 > 1 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 ≡ 𝛼𝛼∗ = 𝛼𝛼∗∗  if  𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 (A-4) 
 
Rewriting (A-4), it turns to  𝛼𝛼 > 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
≡ 𝛼𝛼∗ = 𝛼𝛼∗∗  if  𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 .  
 
 
𝛼𝛼 ≥ 2 − �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴
𝐾𝐾
� ≡ 𝛼𝛼∗∗(𝐾𝐾) (A-2) 
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Figure 2-4-A: Equilibrium under the NOME law with capacity constraint, 𝐾𝐾′ ∈ (𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛)  
 
 
 
Figure 2-4-B: Equilibrium under the NOME law with capacity constraint, 𝐾𝐾′ ∈ (𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛) 
 
 
43 
 
Figure 2-4-C: Equilibrium under the NOME law with capacity constraint, 𝐾𝐾′ ∈ (𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛) 
 
Note: Notaion in Figure 2-4 is as follow. 
𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 ,     𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 
𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾,  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�(𝛼𝛼,𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾 
𝐾𝐾 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 < 𝐾𝐾′ < 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼′ > 𝛼𝛼 > 0 
 
Figure 2-5: Threshold of transfer ratio  𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾)  on equilibrium  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 𝛼𝛼∗(𝐾𝐾) ≡ 1 − 1−2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴+𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵
3𝐾𝐾
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Chapter 3  
Unregulated upstream monopolist in vertical structure:     
Vertical integration versus legal unbundling 
 
3.1. Introduction  
We can see widely the industries consist of upstream monopolist with competitive downstream. The 
upstream monopolist supplies the downstream competitors essential input, which is often called the 
access to network operated by the upstream23. In some of the industries, the upstream monopolist is 
vertically integrated with a downstream firm: in particular, liberalized sectors such that 
telecommunication, gas and electricity. Industries of such vertical structure are subject to be 
investigated by regulators, because the integrated firm might take exclusionary behaviors to its 
downstream rivals. To tackle with these potential issues, some regulatory reforms for vertical 
structure, access charge or downstream prices are proposed in the industries.  
    Reforms for vertical structure are proposed, because the integrated firm has incentive to 
degrade quality of access such that raises the cost of downstream rivals. This non-price 
discrimination is defined as “sabotage” following Beard et al. (2001); sabotage is similar to “raising 
rival’s costs (RRC)” in nature and observed in telecommunication and electricity industry24. Taking 
account of that vertically integrated firm can do sabotage, then the merit of vertical integration, that 
is overcoming the double marginalization problem is weakened. Accordingly, legal unbundling or 
ownership separation is proposed instead of vertical integration. Legal unbundling, originally 
proposed in Europe, is that the entity that supplies the essential input must be independent of its 
management from any other frim supplies downstream, but the firm is allowed to own the entity 
upstream25. While the downstream firm cannot control operations of the entity, it can gain from the 
entity through shareholding. Ownership separation is that regulator requires not only independence 
on legal relationship but also independence on capital relationship between the upstream monopolist 
and a downstream affiliate: namely, vertical separation. In Europe, some countries employ legal 
unbundling and others ownership separation in electricity sector. But, vertical integration is still 
observed in telecommunication and electricity sectors in the U.S; they called “utility”. Like this, 
alternative vertical structures are considered to reform the current vertical structure with a problem. 
It is also discussed that how much the essential input price should be regulated or whether retail 
                                                   
23 Referring Carlton (2008) and Jullien et al. (2013), this vertical structure can be applied to not only 
network industries but also sectors where scarce resources or R&D is bottleneck upstream.  
24 European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007), Competition report on energy sector 
inquiry, part 1, para 169, or para 493, p. 163 
25 The explanation about legal unbundling follows mainly Höffler and Kranz (2011 a, 2011b) and Fiocco 
(2013) who refer Directive 2009/72 EC and 2009/73/EC for electricity market and gas market by each.  
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price should be regulated. When the essential input price is regulated, the integrated firm can have 
incentive to do sabotage. When the downstream retail market is unregulated, margin squeeze can 
happen as a result from that the integrated firm chooses quantity or price optimally. Margin squeeze 
is namely an excessive decrease in price for downstream goods supplied by the integrated firm, 
which may result in foreclosing the rival from the downstream market without violating regulation 
of predatory pricing; the pricing of margin squeeze is expressed as “the price of goods supplied by 
the integrated firm < the marginal cost of the downstream affiliate of the integrated firm + the price 
of essential input”, and the predatory pricing is expressed as “the price of goods supplied by the 
integrated firm < the marginal cost of the downstream rival firm + the price of essential input”. From 
these two expressions, we can see that if the marginal cost of the downstream affiliate of the 
integrated firm is lower than that of the downstream rival firm, the integrated firm clears the 
predatory pricing successfully but its pricing brings margin squeeze to the downstream market. 
Margin squeeze can be the most concern when the price of essential input is high enough. Higher 
input price would compress profit of the rival, and ultimately the rival is to be squeezed from the 
downstream market. Hence, it is important to see that how the essential input price related to vertical 
form would influence competition and output in the downstream market.  
    In this paper, we aim to reconsider vertical forms of the industry consists of upstream 
monopolist and downstream two competitors under vertical integration and legal unbundling. 
Existing literatures comparing legal unbundling with vertical integration or ownership separation 
study under which access charge is regulated at constant level exogenously. In our model, however, 
under which the access charge is set endogenously by the upstream firm, the upstream monopolist is 
supposed to choose a level of sabotage, then downstream competitors are supposed to choose 
quantity simultaneously, taking account of the degree of differentiation of goods or services. 
    We find that vertical integration outperforms legal unbundling in terms of aggregated quantity 
and consumer surplus. Moreover, even when the downstream rival firm is foreclosed from the 
market, the result is maintained. The result obtained in this paper is contrary to others that show that 
legal unbundling can bring large total output in downstream than vertical integration.  
  
3.2. Literature review 
This paper is related with some works in sabotage/raising rival’s costs. Sibley and Weisman (1998) 
examine in quantity competition the incentives to raise the cost of downstream rivals under which 
condition a regulated upstream monopolist is vertically integrated and owns a downstream affiliate: 
reverse legal unbundling as referred by Höffler and Kranz (2011a). The paper says that which 
vertical form outperforms other is mixed. Beard et al. (2001) investigate the presence of incentive 
for sabotage under vertical separation and vertical integration. They indicate that an incentive for 
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sabotage arises only in the presence of regulated price for essential input.  
As Mandy and Sappington (2007) refer, in homogeneous goods quantity competition studied by 
Economides (1998), and in differentiated goods price competition studied by Beard et al. (2001) and 
Kondaurova and Weisman (2003), if upstream profit and sabotage cost are zero or small enough, the 
integrated firm raises the downstream rival’s cost at the equilibrium. However, if the upstream profit 
and initial increments cost of sabotage is large, the integrated firm does not raise the downstream 
rival’s cost at the equilibrium. Mandy and Sappington (2007) also say that, in quantity competition 
with considering the degree of product differentiation, if sabotage cost is assumed to be zero, the 
integrated firm raises the rival’s cost at foreclosing level or does not raise the rival’s cost at all as 
following two reasons. When goods are perfect substitute, if the downstream rival is less efficient 
than the downstream affiliate of integrated firm, the integrated firm raises rival’s cost at foreclosing 
level as noticed by Economides (1998) and Mandy (2000). However, when goods are perfect 
differentiated, the integrated firm does not raise rival’s cost. In addition, assuming increasing cost 
function of sabotage, the integrated firm may raise the rival’s cost at intermediate level.  
There are some recent literatures with respect to legal unbundling comparing other vertical 
forms. Höffler and Kranz (2011a)26 compare four patterns of vertical structure, where perfect legal 
unbundling at least equally outperforms vertical integration and ownership separation, and the 
reverse legal unbundling never outperforms ownership separation in terms of total output. They say 
that absence of access charge regulation may weaken appealing properties of legal unbundling. 
Höffler and Kranz (2011b) in homogeneous quantity competition study imperfect legal unbundling, 
which the upstream monopolist has bias in favor of its downstream parent company. If the bias is 
determined by the ownership share of parent company, it is interpreted as that the parent firm 
chooses sabotage variable under legal unbundling. They find that legal unbundling does not always 
outperform ownership separation because the bias can become active strongly when the downstream 
parent company initially holds ownership share. Fiocco (2013) compares ownership separation with 
legal separation under regulatory limited information about upstream costs. Because the legally 
separated upstream monopolist alleviates the regulator’s control problem, welfare under legal 
separation is higher than ownership separation. Cremer and De Donder (2013) focus on network 
investment. Their setting is different from others in terms of that the upstream monopolist owns one 
downstream firm, which is referred to the reverse legal unbundling in Höffler and Kranz (2011a). 
These two literatures do not take sabotage into account of the model. Above all papers however 
compare vertical forms under access charge is given, or proposed by the regulator.  
Literature examining margin squeeze is also related with our study. In the context of the U.S. 
                                                   
26 They assume that the downstream rival is more efficient in terms of marginal cost than the downstream 
incumbent. 
47 
 
view, Carlton (2008) expresses that margin squeeze does not require a separate abuse, but it is 
enough to apply refusal to deal or predatory pricing. There is a discussion whether margin squeeze 
should be banned. Jullien et al (2013) overview anti-competitive margin squeeze and discuss widely 
under which condition a separate regulation is required. Petulowa and Saavedra (2014) study the 
effect of margin squeeze ban under differentiated price competition. They show that when access 
charge is unregulated, margin squeeze happens as a result of not exclusionary but competitive 
behavior of vertically integrated firm27. Similarly, this paper finds that margin squeeze does not 
foreclose the downstream rival.  
An idea preventing both sabotage and margin squeeze is studied by Weisman (2014). He points 
out that there is access charge such that the integrated firm neither takes sabotage nor margin 
squeeze. He calls the combinations of such access charge and retail price “safe harbor margin ratio”. 
It is shown that safe harbor margin ratio has some ranges when downstream goods are differentiated 
with some degree while it is unique when the downstream goods are homogeneous.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 3.3 introduces basic setting, where 
we derive the inverse demand function considering product differentiation, and assume profit 
functions and the timing of game. In Section 3.4, we obtain equilibrium under vertical integration 
and in Section 3.5, we obtain equilibrium under legal unbundling. In both Section 3.4 and 3.5, we 
study with and without constant access charge regulation. The results obtained in Section 3.4 and 3.5 
will be compared in Section 3.6. Finally, we discuss the results by comparing with ownership 
separation then conclude this chapter in Section 3.7. 
 
3.3. Basic setting  
In Section 3.3, we introduce the model to analyze the problem in this chapter; we first, derive inverse 
demand function from the utility of consumer by considering product differentiation, second, set up 
profit functions of firms, and finally, explain timing of game.    
 
Consumer  
Following Singh and Vives (1984), we employ consumer’s utility function in general form  
as  𝑈𝑈(𝐪𝐪,𝑚𝑚) = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 − 12 �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2 + 2𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗 � + 𝑚𝑚 , where  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  ,  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  ,  𝑚𝑚 and  𝛾𝛾  represent 
quantity of goods 𝑖𝑖 , degree of consumer’s preference for goods 𝑖𝑖 , quantity of numéraire, and degree 
of differentiation of goods ; goods are recognized by consumer as perfect differentiated if  𝛾𝛾 = 0 , 
imperfect differentiated if 𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1), and homogeneous if 𝛾𝛾 = 1, by each. In this study, we assume 
                                                   
27 They also examine the effect of margin squeeze ban under regulated upstream market. They find that 
margin squeeze ban under regulated upstream decreases consumer surplus while the ban under 
unregulated upstream can increase consumer surplus because of the decreasing rival’s cost.   
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that two goods are supplied by two competitors in downstream market, and  𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2 = 1 , so the 
utility function turns to 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞1,𝑞𝑞2,𝑚𝑚) = 𝑞𝑞1𝛼𝛼1 + 𝑞𝑞2𝛼𝛼2 − 12 (𝑞𝑞12 + 𝑞𝑞22 + 2𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞1𝑞𝑞2) + 𝑚𝑚. The problem for 
consumer is solved by maximizing its utility with budget constraint binding on income 𝐼𝐼, which is 
formulized by max𝑞𝑞1,𝑞𝑞2 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞1,𝑞𝑞2,𝑚𝑚)   𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡   ∑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝐼𝐼. After solving the consumer’s problem, 
we obtain inverse demand function, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 > 0, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2( 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗). Taking goods into 
account of some degree of differentiation but not perfect differentiation, we focus on 𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1]. 
 
Firms   
We construct an industry by two-tiers, upstream market and downstream market. There are an 
upstream monopolist and two downstream competitors. Subscript 0, 1 and 2 represent an upstream 
monopolist, downstream incumbent and its rival. Profits are defined as 𝜋𝜋0 = 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2) − 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑2 for 
monopolist, 𝜋𝜋1 = [𝑃𝑃1 − 𝑐𝑐1 − 𝑤𝑤]𝑞𝑞1 for incumbent, and  𝜋𝜋2 = [𝑃𝑃2 − 𝑐𝑐2 − 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑑𝑑]𝑞𝑞2  for rival. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  are price and constant marginal cost of downstream goods for competitors 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 by 
each.  𝑤𝑤  is access charge, assuming that one access charge is input to supply one good.  𝑑𝑑(≥ 0) is 
effect of “sabotage” imposed by the monopolist. Sabotage is observed as foreclosing behavior taken 
by vertically integrated upstream monopolist in telecommunication or electricity sectors28.When the 
monopolist takes sabotage, it can raise marginal cost of downstream rival while it expenses 
increasing cost in level of sabotage 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑2,𝑘𝑘 > 0. This sabotage cost is interpreted as fine to pay if 
sabotage is detected. Sabotage is in a model similar to raising rival’s cost (RRC) and non-price 
discrimination. Joint profit of monopolist and downstream incumbent is defined as 𝜋𝜋01 ≡ 𝜋𝜋0 + 𝜋𝜋1, 
so  𝜋𝜋01 = [𝑃𝑃1 − 𝑐𝑐1]𝑞𝑞1  + 𝑤𝑤𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑2. Regarding marginal costs for each firm, we transform them 
and define  ∆≡ (𝛼𝛼2 − 𝑐𝑐2) / (𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑐𝑐1), and standardizing  𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑐𝑐1 = 1, then ∆= (𝛼𝛼2 − 𝑐𝑐2), which 
parameter measures relative efficiency per quality of goods29 ; Rival is more efficient if  ∆> 1 , less 
efficient if  ∆< 1, and equally efficient if  ∆= 1.  
 
Timing of game 
The game constructed here corresponds to two environments with respect to access charge: 
exogenously regulated access charge and endogenously unregulated access charge. Our analysis 
mainly focus on environment under unregulated access charge, where in stage 1 and stage 2, the 
monopolist sets access charge 𝑤𝑤(≥ 0), consecutively chooses sabotage variable 𝑑𝑑(≥ 0), and finally 
in stage 3, downstream competitors choose their quantities 𝑞𝑞1 and 𝑞𝑞2 simultaneously30. To compare 
                                                   
28 European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007), Competition report on energy sector 
inquiry, part 1, para 169, or para 493, p. 163 
29 We follow this model to Häckner (2000), Zanchettin (2006) and Petulowa and Saavedra (2014). 
30 Following Créti et al.(2013) and Bushnell et al.(2008), in liberalized electricity industry, downstream 
firms are assumed to choose quantities. 
49 
 
with the environment under regulated access charge, the game is reduced to be two stages; stage 1 in 
which the upstream monopolist chooses access charge is to be removed from the game.  
We compere outcomes from two vertical forms in this industry. Under vertical integration, it is 
natural to model that objective functions for both the incumbent and monopolist are the joint 
profit  𝜋𝜋01. Under legal unbundling, following Höffler and Kranz (2011 a)31, we model that objective 
function for the incumbent is the joint profit  𝜋𝜋1, while objective function for the monopolist is its 
own profit  𝜋𝜋0. We solve the three stage game backward, then obtain Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium (SPNE). 
 
3.4. Equilibrium under vertical Integration 
This section studies vertical integration under regulated access charge in Subsection 3.4.1 and 
unregulated access charge in Subsection 3.4.2. In both environments, we solve the game backward to 
obtain SPNE. 
 
3.4.1. Regulated access charge 
 
Stage 3 
Vertically integrated firm and its downstream rival choose their quantities simultaneously to 
maximize their objective functions such that 𝑞𝑞1∗ ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋01 and 𝑞𝑞2∗ ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋2. Then, derived 
best response functions are 𝑞𝑞1(𝑞𝑞2) = 12 (𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑐𝑐1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞2) and 𝑞𝑞2(𝑞𝑞1) = 12 (𝛼𝛼2 − 𝑐𝑐2 − 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞1). 
Solving these equations simultaneously, which leads to equilibrium prices and quantities at stage 3 
denoted by superscript * as follow. 
 
𝑞𝑞1
∗ = 2 + 𝛾𝛾(𝑑𝑑 + 𝑤𝑤 − 𝛥𝛥)4 − 𝛾𝛾2  , 𝑞𝑞2∗ = 2(𝛥𝛥 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑤𝑤) − 𝛾𝛾4 − 𝛾𝛾2 ,   𝑄𝑄∗ ≡ 𝑞𝑞1∗ + 𝑞𝑞2∗ = 1 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑤𝑤 + 𝛥𝛥2 + 𝛾𝛾   .   
(3-1) 
𝑃𝑃1
∗ = 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑤𝑤 + 2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥 − 𝑤𝑤(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2) + 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾4 − 𝛾𝛾2 ,𝑃𝑃2∗ = 𝑐𝑐2 + 𝑤𝑤 + 2𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾 − 2𝑤𝑤 + 𝑑𝑑(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)4 − 𝛾𝛾2  
 
Substituting these prices and quantities to each profit function, then we obtain the equilibrium profits 
at stage 3 denoted by superscript * as  
 
𝜋𝜋01
∗ = (2 + 𝛾𝛾[𝑑𝑑 + 𝑤𝑤 − 𝛥𝛥])2(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝑤𝑤�𝛾𝛾 + 2[𝑑𝑑 + 𝑤𝑤 − 𝛥𝛥]�4 − 𝛾𝛾2 − 𝑑𝑑2𝑘𝑘  ,𝜋𝜋2∗ = �𝛾𝛾 + 2[𝑑𝑑 + 𝑤𝑤 − 𝛥𝛥]4 − 𝛾𝛾2 �2. (3-2) 
                                                   
31 See also Höffler and Kranz (2011 b), Cremer and De Dondor (2013) and Fiocco (2013). 
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Stage 2 
The integrated firm chooses sabotage as  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋01∗  s. t.𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0. Then, we derive that the first 
order condition is   𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋01∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 2𝛾𝛾(2−𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)−4(2−𝛾𝛾2)𝑤𝑤+2(𝛾𝛾2−𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)2)𝜕𝜕(4−𝛾𝛾2)2   and the second order condition 
is   𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋01∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
= 2𝛾𝛾2(4−𝛾𝛾2)2 − 2𝑘𝑘 < 0,    ∀ 𝑘𝑘 > 𝛾𝛾2(4−𝛾𝛾2)2  . Because the profit function  𝜋𝜋01∗  is quadratic with 
respect to 𝑑𝑑 , and the second order condition is negative,  𝜋𝜋01∗   is concave function of  𝑑𝑑 . In advance, 
we define that  𝑘𝑘� ≡ 1
4−𝛾𝛾2
  and  ?̃?𝛥 ≡ [𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)+1]𝛾𝛾
2𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)   for the condition to ensure the rival’s quantity 
positive later. 
 
( i ) Sabotage  
After maximizing the profit of integrated firm, we have the optimal sabotage level 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 :  
 
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 𝛾𝛾(2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥) − 2(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝑤𝑤
𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2   . (3-3) 
 
The condition for 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 with respect to 𝑘𝑘 is obtained as below. 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0   if   𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤�  ≡ 𝛾𝛾(2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)2(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)  when  𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 > 𝑘𝑘� > 𝛾𝛾2(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 . 
 
(3-4) 
 
Following Mandy and Sappington (2007) who study in differentiated quantity competition, assuming 
no cost for sabotage (𝑘𝑘 = 0)  in our model, the integrated firm was expected to do sabotage at 
foreclosing level when  𝛾𝛾 = 1. However, the integrated actually does not do sabotage at all. We also 
define the foreclosing sabotage level 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 such that  𝑞𝑞2∗ = 0 : 
 
𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 = 2(𝛥𝛥 −𝑤𝑤) − 𝛾𝛾2  (3-5) 
 
( ii ) Margin squeeze  
In a theory of predatory pricing, it is prohibited that the vertically integrated firm prices below its 
rival’s marginal cost. Predatory pricing is expressed as 𝑃𝑃1 < 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑐𝑐  in which  𝑐𝑐  is marginal cost of 
upstream and we assume  𝑐𝑐 = 0  in this study. This form of pricing is regulated in antitrust or 
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competition policy. However, it is possible for the integrated firm to foreclose its downstream rival 
with avoiding predatory pricing. When the integrated firm sets access charge imposed to its 
downstream rival higher, the access charge can be such that  𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑤𝑤 > 𝑃𝑃1 > 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑐𝑐  . While an 
increase in  𝑤𝑤  results in  𝑃𝑃1 <  𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑤𝑤  , rival’s marginal profit can be negative  𝑃𝑃2 −  𝑐𝑐2 − 𝑤𝑤 < 0  , 
then it would make rival to be foreclosed from the downstream market. It is discussed that under 
which condition margin squeeze should be regulated. Following existing literature, we say that under 
regulated access charge  𝑤𝑤  , margin squeeze happens at the equilibrium when the inequality holds as 
below32. 
𝑃𝑃1
∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) < 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑤𝑤   if  𝑤𝑤 > 𝑤𝑤�  ≡ 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)
𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)  when  𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 > 𝑘𝑘�   given  𝛥𝛥 >  ?̃?𝛥   
 
(3-6) 
 
( iii ) Safe harbor access charge 
We defined  𝑤𝑤�  and  𝑤𝑤�  in Eq.(3-4) and Eq.(3-5). Next, we check whether  𝑤𝑤� ≥ 𝑤𝑤�   holds. When final 
goods are imperfect substitute 𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1), it holds  𝑤𝑤� > 𝑤𝑤�   if  𝑘𝑘 > 𝑘𝑘�   given  𝛥𝛥 ∈ � ?̃?𝛥 , 2
𝛾𝛾
 �. Then, we 
say that  𝑤𝑤�   is the upper bound such that margin squeeze does not happen under no sabotage, 
and  𝑤𝑤�  is the lower bound such that sabotage is not taken under no margin squeeze. Thus, if access 
charge is set at 𝑤𝑤 ∈ [𝑤𝑤� ,𝑤𝑤�], neither margin squeeze nor sabotage happen33. Following Weisman 
(2014), we say the access charge that exists between the upper bound and the lower bound safe 
harbor access charge34. When final goods are perfect substitute  𝛾𝛾 = 1, the upper bound and the 
lower bound converge to unique value  𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 ≡ 𝑤𝑤� =  𝑤𝑤�  , and so does safe harbor access charge.  
 
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
Substituting the optimal sabotage  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉  which realizes at stage 2 into both  𝑞𝑞1∗  and  𝑞𝑞2∗  which realize at 
stage 3, we obtain the SPNE values.  
The quantities are  
𝑞𝑞1
∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 𝛾𝛾(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)
𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑤𝑤 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2    
(3-7) and  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = −�2(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2 �𝑤𝑤 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾) − 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2  
                                                   
32 This margin squeeze formulation is following Petulowa and Saavedra (2014) 
33 Such a relationship between 𝑤𝑤�  and 𝑤𝑤�  was also assured by Weisman (2014) in more general model. 
34 The range of safe harbor access charge is derived from  𝑤𝑤� −  𝑤𝑤� = (1−𝛾𝛾)(𝑘𝑘�4−𝛾𝛾2�2−𝛾𝛾2)(2−𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)
2(2−𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)((4−𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2)−𝛾𝛾2+𝛾𝛾). 
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and aggregating them, 
𝑄𝑄∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) ≡ 𝑞𝑞1∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) + 𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 + 𝛥𝛥 −𝑤𝑤) + (2 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤 − 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2  
Downstream incumbent can be active, 𝑞𝑞1∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0  if  𝑤𝑤 >  0   and  𝛥𝛥 ∈ � ?̃?𝛥 , 2𝛾𝛾 �. Downstream rival 
can be active,  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0  if   𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤∗ ≡ 𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾)−𝛾𝛾2[𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)−1]  and  𝛥𝛥 > ?̃?𝛥 . Each of them holds for 
any  𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 > 𝑘𝑘�   and  𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1] .  
The prices are  
 
𝑃𝑃1
∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝛾𝛾(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑤𝑤 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2    
(3-8) and  𝑃𝑃2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 𝑐𝑐2 + (2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑤𝑤 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2  
 
The sabotage level is as we showed 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 𝛾𝛾(2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥) − 2(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝑤𝑤
𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2  (3-9) 
 
The profits are  
𝜋𝜋01
∗ = 𝑤𝑤(𝑤𝑤 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝑘𝑘�−𝑤𝑤2(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) + (2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)2 + 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾3 + 8𝛥𝛥 − 4𝛾𝛾2𝛥𝛥)�
𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2 ,   
(3-10) and  𝜋𝜋2∗ = �−2(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)𝑤𝑤 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾) − 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2 �2 = �𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉)�2 
 
The condition on parameters  {𝑘𝑘,𝛥𝛥} for  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 > 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0  such that  𝑞𝑞2∗ > 0   is drawn as follow. 
 
Condition 
Under regulated access charge  𝑤𝑤  is given, if  𝑤𝑤 <  𝑤𝑤∗ ≡ 𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾)−𝛾𝛾
2[𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)−1]  , the rival would be active 
in the downstream market (𝑞𝑞2∗ > 0) while the integrated firm does sabotage optimally  (𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0) to 
the extent under which parameters  {𝑘𝑘,𝛥𝛥}  are larger than  �𝑘𝑘� , ?̃?𝛥� . This condition is consistent with 
the assumption 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1  because it holds  𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 > 𝑘𝑘�   for any  𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1]. 
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The condition is derived as following manner. To find the optimal sabotage   𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0  such 
that  𝑞𝑞2∗ > 0 , by using  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 − 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = (4−𝛾𝛾2){−2(𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)−1)𝑤𝑤+𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾)−𝛾𝛾}2(𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)2−𝛾𝛾2) , we draw a condition on 
parameters   {𝑘𝑘,𝛥𝛥} for   𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 < 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 . Taking account of   𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉  , if   𝑤𝑤 <  𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾)−𝛾𝛾
2[𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)−1] ≡ 𝑤𝑤∗ satisfying 
with  𝑘𝑘 >  1
4−𝛾𝛾2
≡ 𝑘𝑘� and  𝛥𝛥 > [𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)+1]𝛾𝛾
2𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2) ≡ ?̃?𝛥 , it results in 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 < 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 and then  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0 . On the 
other hand, if  𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤∗, it results in  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 and then  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 0 ; 𝑤𝑤∗  is a crossing point such 
that  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉  is equivalent to 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹. 
 
Effect of access charge  
We provide three cases for which threshold  𝑤𝑤∗ or  𝑤𝑤�   become lower than another or are equivalent 
(1)   min[𝑤𝑤∗,𝑤𝑤�] = 𝑤𝑤�   if  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 , (2)   𝑤𝑤∗ =  𝑤𝑤�   if  𝛥𝛥 = 𝛾𝛾 ,  (3)  min[𝑤𝑤∗,𝑤𝑤�] = 𝑤𝑤∗  if  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛾𝛾 .These 
conditions are relevant with  𝑘𝑘 > 𝑘𝑘�  ,∀ 𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1]. Under the regulated access charge, we can explain 
four cases as shown in Figure 3-1. We can see that  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0  and 𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0 go together from case 
(i) to (iii) while that  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 and 𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 0 from case (iv) below. 
 
(i)   𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤� = 𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥,𝑘𝑘)    if  𝛥𝛥 = 𝛾𝛾    ⇒  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 > 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 and  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0 
(ii)  𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤� < 𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥′,𝑘𝑘)    if  𝛥𝛥′ > 𝛾𝛾   ⇒  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 > 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 and  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0 
(iii)  𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥′′,𝑘𝑘) < 𝑤𝑤�    if  𝛥𝛥′′ < 𝛾𝛾  ⇒  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 > 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 and  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0 
(iv)  𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥′′,𝑘𝑘) ≤ 𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤�    if  𝛥𝛥′′ < 𝛾𝛾   ⇒ 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 = 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 and  𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) = 0 
 
When the rival can be equally efficient to the downstream incumbent like   𝛥𝛥 = 𝛾𝛾  , the 
integrated firm optimally chooses sabotage at no foreclosing level as long as  𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤� = 𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥,𝑘𝑘), the 
rival is to be active in the downstream market.  
In case (i) and (ii), an increase in the degree of cost of sabotage like  𝑘𝑘′ > 𝑘𝑘 does not change the 
extent of access charge to which the rival is not foreclosed. In case (iii), the rival can be foreclosed 
easily by taking sabotage because the extent of access charge to which the rival is not foreclosed 
becomes narrower. However, an increase in the degree of cost of sabotage like  𝑘𝑘′ > 𝑘𝑘 makes 
foreclosing harder because the extent of access charge to which the rival is not foreclosed becomes 
wider:  𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥′′,𝑘𝑘) < 𝑤𝑤∗(𝛥𝛥′′,𝑘𝑘′) < 𝑤𝑤� .  
Hence, under the exogenously regulated access charge, how costly sabotage is important for the 
rival not to be foreclosed easily when the rival is never efficient than the downstream incumbent 
while it is not important for the rival so much not to be foreclosed when the rival can be equally or 
more efficient. 
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Figure 3-1: Effect of regulated access charge 𝑤𝑤∗ on sabotage  
 
Note: The solid line shows  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 and the dotted line shows  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉. The  𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 line shifts in parallel upward 
or downward by  𝛥𝛥 and 𝛾𝛾. The  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉  line moves counterclockwise as  𝑘𝑘 becomes larger. Intercept on 
vertical axis of 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹 is higher than that of 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉since the sign of the difference between them is 
calculated as   2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾
2
−
𝛾𝛾(2−𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)
𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)2−𝛾𝛾2 = (4−𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾)−𝛾𝛾)2(𝑘𝑘(4−𝛾𝛾2)2−𝛾𝛾2) > 0  if 𝑘𝑘 > 𝛾𝛾(4−𝛾𝛾2)(2𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾)  and 2𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾. 
 
3.4.2. Unregulated access charge  
To obtain equilibrium values under unregulated access charge, we solve for the access charge at 
stage 1 by substituting equilibrium values obtained under regulated access charge into the profit of 
integrated firm. 
 
Stage 1  
The profit functions for each firm obtained at stage 2 by solving backward are explained as Eq. 
(3-10). The integrated firm chooses access charge such that 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋01∗ . Then we have, 
𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 = 4𝑘𝑘(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥 + 𝑘𝑘𝛾𝛾3 − 𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 2   . (3-11) 
It holds  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 0  no matter which  𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1  or  𝛥𝛥 < 1 35.  
                                                   
35 This is proven in Appendix 1. 
0
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Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
By substituting the equilibrium values obtained at stage 1 and stage 2 to the equilibrium values 
at stage 3, we derive the SNPE values under the vertical integration. The SPNE values  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉,𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 ,𝜋𝜋01𝑉𝑉 ,𝜋𝜋2𝑉𝑉  and 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 are quantities, prices, sabotage, profits and consumer surplus, which 
are expressed by only parameters, the degree of substitution of final goods  𝛾𝛾 , the degree of relative 
efficiency  𝛥𝛥  , and the degree of cost for sabotage  𝑘𝑘  . By rewriting the utility function, we 
have  𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞1, 𝑞𝑞2) = 𝑞𝑞1𝛼𝛼1 + 𝑞𝑞2𝛼𝛼2 − 12 (𝑞𝑞12 + 𝑞𝑞22) − 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞1𝑞𝑞2 − (𝑃𝑃1𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑞𝑞2) + 𝐼𝐼 . Substituting  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉   and 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉   into  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖   and  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 and then replacing  𝛼𝛼1 = 1 + 𝑐𝑐1 and  𝛼𝛼2 = 𝛥𝛥 + 𝑐𝑐2, which leads to 
consumer surplus. We provide the SPNE values in next page.  
The quantities are 
𝑞𝑞1
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑘𝑘(8 − 𝛾𝛾2 − 2𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥) − 12(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)   and   𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 = 4𝑘𝑘(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)2(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)  . 
and aggregating them, 
𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉 ≡ 𝑞𝑞1
𝑉𝑉 + 𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 = 𝑘𝑘(8 + 4[𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾] − 2𝛥𝛥𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 12(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)   . 
 
 
(3-12) 
Downstream incumbent can be active, 𝑞𝑞1∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0  if  8𝑘𝑘−𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘−12𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 >  𝛥𝛥. Downstream rival can be 
active, 𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0  if  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 .  
The prices are 
𝑃𝑃1
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑘𝑘(8 − 𝛾𝛾2 − 2𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥) − 12[𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1]    
and  𝑃𝑃2𝑉𝑉 = 𝑐𝑐2 + 2𝛥𝛥[2𝑘𝑘(3 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1] − 𝛾𝛾[𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1]2[𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1] . 
 
 
(3-13) 
The sabotage level is  
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛥𝛥
𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1 ≥ 0  if  𝛾𝛾 ≥ 𝛥𝛥. (3-14) 
The profits are 
𝜋𝜋01
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑘𝑘(8 + 𝛾𝛾2 − 8𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥 + 4𝛥𝛥2) − 14(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)  
and  𝜋𝜋2𝑉𝑉 = 4𝑘𝑘2(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)2(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)2 = (𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉)2 > 0  if   𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 
 
 
(3-15) 
Finally, the consumer surplus is  
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ≡
1 + 𝑘𝑘2[ 9𝛾𝛾4 + 12𝛾𝛾3𝛥𝛥 + 4(4 − 3𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥2 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾2)64] − 2𝑘𝑘(8 − 5𝛾𝛾2 + 2𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)8(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)2 + 𝐼𝐼 . (3-16) 
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We can see that immediately  𝑃𝑃1𝑉𝑉 = 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑉𝑉, and that  𝑃𝑃2𝑉𝑉 > 𝑐𝑐236.  
When it holds  𝛥𝛥 = 𝛾𝛾  , while the rival cannot be active in the downstream market  (𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 = 0), 
the integrated downstream monopolizes the market without sabotage (𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 0 ) and supplies more 
than duopoly level it engaged before; we can see that decrease in   𝛥𝛥  to be equal to   𝛾𝛾  
makes  𝑞𝑞1𝑉𝑉  increase. Even if the cost of sabotage is assumed to be an increasing function in our 
model, the integrated firm does sabotage up to the foreclosing level when there is an incentive for 
sabotage. This result is unexpected one because we expected that the integrated firm would choose 
sabotage at intermediate level in which the rival would not be foreclosed from the downstream 
market37. This can be explained that the integrated firm benefits from monopolization more than 
paying fine for foreclosing the rival.     
It is necessary to hold  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾  for the rival to be active  (𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 0). This implicates that the more 
homogeneous the final goods are, the more required to be efficient the rival is. Ultimately, when 
final goods are perfect substitute ( 𝛾𝛾 = 1), the rival must be more efficient (𝛥𝛥 > 1). The condition 
for the rival to be active is inconsistent with the condition for sabotage  (𝛾𝛾 > 𝛥𝛥). In other words, the 
condition for the rival to be active is equivalent to the condition for the integrated firm not to do 
sabotage. Together all, both firms supply if  𝛥𝛥 ∈ �𝛾𝛾, 8𝑘𝑘−𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘−1
2𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘
�. The relative efficiency for the 
rival (𝛥𝛥) is only the factor to sabotage, but not the degree of cost of sabotage 𝑘𝑘.  
When the rival can be at least equally efficient to the downstream incumbent  𝛥𝛥 ≥ 𝛾𝛾 , then the 
integrated firm chooses access charge not to do sabotage:  𝑤𝑤� < 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 < 𝑤𝑤∗. When the rival is never 
efficient than the downstream incumbent 𝛥𝛥′ < 𝛾𝛾 , then the integrated firm chooses access charge to 
do sabotage at foreclosing level:  𝑤𝑤∗ < 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 < 𝑤𝑤� .    
By taking account of unregulated access charge  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 , we rewrite the condition under which 
margin squeeze happens as  
𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 𝑤𝑤�   if  𝛥𝛥 >  𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 > 𝛾𝛾 >  ?̃?𝛥  where   𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 ≡ 𝑘𝑘(8 − 𝛾𝛾2 − 𝛾𝛾3) + 𝛾𝛾 − 12𝑘𝑘(4 + 𝛾𝛾 − 2𝛾𝛾2) 38 . (3-17) 
 
Even if margin squeeze happens, the rival supplies to downstream market and the integrated firm 
does not do sabotage; that is  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 0 but  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 0 . As we know under regulated access charge, if the 
relative efficiency for the rival is  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾, margin squeeze can happen instead of sabotage. Under 
unregulated access charge, if the rival is more efficient such that  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 > 𝛾𝛾, margin squeeze does 
                                                   
36 This is proven in Appendix 2. 
37 Mandy and Sappington (2007) say that when the cost function of sabotage is increasing, there might be 
an interior solution of sabotage. That level of sabotage is not foreclosing but intermediate one. 
38 This condition is proven in Appendix 4. 
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happen, where  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉  is smaller than the case in no margin squeeze. Increase in   𝛥𝛥  more 
than  𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 makes  𝑞𝑞1𝑉𝑉   decrease. This result is consist with Petulowa and Saavedra (2014), who show 
that under unregulated upstream market margin squeeze happens if the downstream rival is relatively 
more efficient39. 
To understand the condition for margin squeeze more intuitively, think the case of  𝛾𝛾 = 1. Then, 
we can see what to the extent that the degree of relative efficiency is acceptable for the integrated 
firm; that is  𝑞𝑞1𝑉𝑉(𝛥𝛥,𝑘𝑘) > 0  if   7𝑘𝑘−12𝑘𝑘 >  𝛥𝛥 when  𝑘𝑘 > 13 . Assuming   𝑘𝑘 = 23 > 13  for example, the 
condition turns to be  2.75 >  𝛥𝛥  . Thus, the integrated firm does not care about how much the rival is 
more or less efficient so much.  
We are interested in how the relationship between  𝛥𝛥  and  𝛾𝛾 affects  𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉 , because the positive 
𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾, as we know, is the condition for make the rival be active in downstream market, and 
increases  𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉  while  𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉  decreases in  𝛥𝛥𝛾𝛾 .Thereby,  𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉 is affected by whether 4[𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾] − 2𝛥𝛥𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2  
is positive or negative; formally,   𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉   is larger if  𝛥𝛥 ≥ 𝛾𝛾(4+𝛾𝛾)
2(2−𝛾𝛾)  compared with   𝛥𝛥 < 𝛾𝛾(4+𝛾𝛾)2(2−𝛾𝛾)  . In 
numerical explanation,  𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉 is larger if   𝛥𝛥 ≥ 2.5, 𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1  and   𝛥𝛥 ≥ 0.75  when 𝛾𝛾 = 1, 𝛾𝛾 ≈ 0.6   
and  𝛾𝛾 = 0.5  by each.  
 
Effect of access charge  
We show that the unregulated access charge does not let  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 0 and  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 go together by two 
properties with respect to 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉as follow. First, the condition under which  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 0 such that 𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 0  
is drawn by  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 < 𝑤𝑤∗  if  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 . Second, the condition under which  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 0  such that 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 is 
drawn by  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 < 𝑤𝑤�   if  𝛾𝛾 > 𝛥𝛥 > ?̃?𝛥 . These two properties bring three results as follow 40. 
 
(i)    𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 >  𝑤𝑤�   if  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾   ⇒  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 0  and  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 0.  
(ii)  𝑤𝑤∗ = 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 =  𝑤𝑤�   if   𝛥𝛥 = 𝛾𝛾   ⇒  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 = 0  and  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 = 0.  
(iii)  𝑤𝑤� > 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 𝑤𝑤∗  if  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛾𝛾    ⇒  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 = 0  and  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0.  
 
Summarizing, we find that it is not feasible that  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 < min[𝑤𝑤� ,𝑤𝑤∗]  where  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 0 and  𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 > 0 . 
Thus, we obtain proposition 1 in next page. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
39 This type of margin squeeze is called “technological margin squeeze” in their study. 
40 The relationship among  𝑤𝑤∗, 𝑤𝑤�   ,𝑤𝑤�  and  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉  are proven in Appendix 3. 
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Proposition 1 
Under unregulated access charge, 
(A) when the downstream rival can be at least equally efficient to the integrated downstream, the 
integrated firm does not do sabotage, then the rival is active in the downstream market, and  
(B) when the downstream rival is never efficient than the integrated downstream, the integrated firm 
does sabotage at foreclosing level, then the rival cannot be active in the downstream market which 
results in monopolization. 
 
This proposition 1 is related with Beard et al.(2001) who investigated the incentive for sabotage 
under both regulated and unregulated access charge.  
It is well known that the merit of vertical integration is to overcome double marginalization 
problem that happens if it were vertically separated. It is beneficial not only for firms’ interests but 
also expanding outcome. This is a reason why firms have incentives to vertically integrate and 
vertical integration is desirable in terms of total welfare. However, under monopolistic upstream 
market, if vertically integrated firm can do sabotage/RRC by means of non-price discrimination to 
its downstream rival, vertical integration could be harmful for fair competition and market outcome. 
Hence, this is not only academic but also policy issue to rethink of the vertical structure of industry 
with upstream monopolist. In next section, we analyze model under legal unbundling when the 
upstream monopolist is assumed, contrary to previous studies, to be able to choose access charge.  
 
3.5. Equilibrium under legal unbundling 
In this section, we change our point of view on the vertical form from vertical integration to legal 
unbundling; the integrated firm is separated to a downstream incumbent as parent company and an 
independent upstream monopolist. The downstream incumbent is a perfect shareholder of the 
upstream monopolist while the upstream monopolist does not hold any ownership share of the 
downstream incumbent. Following Höffler and Kranz (2011a), legal unbundling in our study is 
modeled into two features. First, the downstream incumbent chooses its quantity at stage 3 to 
maximize joint profit as well as it were vertically integrated firm. Second, the upstream monopolist 
chooses the level of access charge at stage 1 and then the level of sabotage at stage 2 to maximize its 
own profit by each stage. Solving three stages game backward, we obtain equilibrium as follow in 
Subsection 3.5.1 for regulated access charge and Subsection 3.5.2 for unregulated access charge.  
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3.5.1. Regulated access charge 
 
Stage 3 
Now, the downstream incumbent fully holding the share of upstream monopolist and its downstream 
rival choose their quantities simultaneously as well as under vertical integration; formally, they 
choose 𝑞𝑞1∗ ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋01  and  𝑞𝑞2∗ ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋2 . Then we obtain same equilibrium values at stage 3 
as what we had in vertical integration model.   
 
Stage 2 
( i ) Sabotage 
We define  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿  as the sabotage level that the upstream monopolist chooses optimally at stage 2 under 
legal unbundling. Solving the problem described as 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋0(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗) s. t.𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0 leads to 
 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 = 0   . (3-18) 
 
Because the level of sabotage in this study is assumed to be non-negative ( 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0 ), the upstream 
monopolist chooses no sabotage instead of choosing sabotage at negative level41. When access 
charge is regulated, it is straightforward to see that total output under no sabotage is larger than that 
under choosing sabotage at positive level42. This result comes from that the upstream monopolist can 
increase its profit by only increasing in total output in downstream market. If the monopolist does 
sabotage, total output will not increase. Hence, when access charge is regulated, legal unbundling is 
better than vertical integration in terms of total output as mentioned in current studies. However, 
when access charge is unregulated and is set endogenously, we show that the result is reversed in 
next section.   
 
( ii ) Margin squeeze 
    Because margin squeeze is known as the problem that can happen under vertical integration, we 
ignore the analysis of margin squeeze here. For readers who are interested in investigation of margin 
squeeze under legal unbundling, see Appendix 5.  
 
                                                   
41 If we assume to the extent of negative sabotage, the solution would be  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 = −� 𝑤𝑤
2𝑘𝑘(2+𝛾𝛾)� < 0. Höffler 
and Kranz (2011 a) also analyze in investments in reducing upstream marginal cost and into network 
capacity by means of sabotage variable 𝑑𝑑 . Referring Arya and Sappington (2013), assuming that the 
upstream monopolist engages in R&D to help decrease its downstream rival’s cost, it is possible 
to 𝑑𝑑 takes negative.  
42 This is formally expressed as  𝑄𝑄∗(𝑑𝑑 = 0) > 𝑄𝑄∗(𝑑𝑑 > 0) → 1−𝑤𝑤+𝛥𝛥
2+𝛾𝛾
> 1−𝜕𝜕−𝑤𝑤+𝛥𝛥
2+𝛾𝛾
. 
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Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
The SPNE values under regulated access charge are expressed as follow. 
 
The quantities are  
𝑞𝑞1
∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = 2 − 𝛾𝛾(𝛥𝛥 − 𝑤𝑤)4 − 𝛾𝛾2   and   𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = 2(𝛥𝛥 − 𝑤𝑤) − 𝛾𝛾4 − 𝛾𝛾2  
Aggregating them, 
𝑄𝑄∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) ≡ 𝑞𝑞1∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) + 𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = 1 + 𝛥𝛥 − 𝑤𝑤2 + 𝛾𝛾  
 
 
 
(3-19) 
Downstream incumbent can be active,  𝑞𝑞1∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0  if   2+𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 >  𝛥𝛥 . Downstream rival can be 
active, 𝑞𝑞2∗(𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉) > 0  if  𝛥𝛥 > 2𝑤𝑤+𝛾𝛾2 .  
 
The prices are  
𝑃𝑃1
∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝛾𝛾24 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑤𝑤 + 2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥4 − 𝛾𝛾2    and   𝑃𝑃2∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = 𝑐𝑐2 + 2 − 𝛾𝛾24 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑤𝑤 + 2𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾4 − 𝛾𝛾2   (3-20) 
 
The profits are 
𝜋𝜋0
∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = 𝑤𝑤(1 −𝑤𝑤 + 𝛥𝛥)2 + 𝛾𝛾 , 
𝜋𝜋1
∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = �2 − 𝛾𝛾(𝛥𝛥 − 𝑤𝑤)�(2 −𝑤𝑤(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2   and  𝜋𝜋2∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) = �2(𝛥𝛥 − 𝑤𝑤)− 𝛾𝛾4 − 𝛾𝛾2 �2 
 
 
(3-21) 
Downstream incumbent gains   𝜋𝜋1∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) > 0  if    2+𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 > 2−𝑤𝑤(4−𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2)𝛾𝛾 > 𝛥𝛥 . Downstream rival 
gains 𝜋𝜋2∗(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿) > 0  if   2−𝑤𝑤(4−𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2)𝛾𝛾 > 𝛥𝛥 > 2𝑤𝑤+𝛾𝛾2 .  Together all, both downstream firms are to be 
active in the market and gain profits    if   2 + 𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾
> 2 −𝑤𝑤(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)
𝛾𝛾
> 𝛥𝛥 > 2𝑤𝑤 + 𝛾𝛾2  . (3-22) 
 
This inequality (3-22) holds because 2 + 𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾
−
2 −𝑤𝑤(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)
𝛾𝛾
= 𝑤𝑤 �4
𝛾𝛾
− 𝛾𝛾� > 0 
and  2 −𝑤𝑤(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)
𝛾𝛾
−
2𝑤𝑤 + 𝛾𝛾2 = (1 − 2𝑤𝑤)(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2𝛾𝛾 > 0  if  12 > 𝑤𝑤 > 0 
 
 
(3-23) 
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3.5.2. Unregulated access charge  
The upstream monopolist chooses  𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  to maximize its own profit taking account of the equilibrium 
values realizes at stage 2 and stage 3. 
 
Stage 1 
Solving the problem described as  𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 ∈ argmax 𝜋𝜋0(𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿,𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗), which leads to 
 
𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 1 + 𝛥𝛥2  . (3-24) 
 
As we can see that, the optimal unregulated access charge  𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  is now not affected by the degree of 
differentiation of goods and the degree of cost for sabotage, but affected by only the degree of 
relative efficiency 𝛥𝛥 . The more efficient downstream rival is, the higher access charge becomes.  
 
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
Taking account of the equilibrium values obtained at stage 1 and stage 2 by solving backward, we 
have the SPNE values. The SPNE values under legal unbundling are  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 ,𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 ,𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  and  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 , 
which are expressed by only parameters: the degree of substitution of final goods  𝛾𝛾 , the degree of 
relative efficiency  𝛥𝛥  , and the degree of cost for sabotage  𝑘𝑘  . 
 
The quantities are 
𝑞𝑞1
𝐿𝐿 = 4 + (1 − 𝛥𝛥)𝛾𝛾8 − 2𝛾𝛾2   and   𝑞𝑞2𝐿𝐿 = 2(𝛥𝛥 − 1 − 𝛾𝛾)8 − 2𝛾𝛾2    
Aggregating them, 
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿 ≡ 𝑞𝑞1
𝐿𝐿 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐿𝐿 = 1 + 𝛥𝛥4 + 2𝛾𝛾  . 
 
 
 
(3-25) 
Downstream incumbent can be active  𝑞𝑞1𝐿𝐿 > 0  if  4+𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 > 𝛥𝛥. Downstream rival  𝑞𝑞2𝐿𝐿 > 0  can be active 
if  𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 + 1.   
The prices are 
 
𝑃𝑃1
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐𝑐1 + 4 + (1 − 𝛥𝛥)𝛾𝛾8 − 2𝛾𝛾2    
and  𝑃𝑃2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐𝑐2 + 2 + (6 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥 − (2 + 𝛾𝛾)𝛾𝛾8 − 2𝛾𝛾2 . 
 
 
(3-26) 
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The profits are  
 
Downstream incumbent gains  𝜋𝜋1𝐿𝐿 > 0  if  𝛾𝛾+𝛾𝛾24+𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2 > 𝛥𝛥. Downstream rival gains  𝜋𝜋2𝐿𝐿 > 0 if 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 + 1.  
Together all, we can see that only one downstream firm is to be active in the market and gain 
profits43. Only downstream incumbent is to be active and gain profit if   4+𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾
> 𝛾𝛾 + 1 > 𝛾𝛾+𝛾𝛾2
4+𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2
> 𝛥𝛥. 
Otherwise, only downstream entrant is to be active and gain profit if   4+𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾
> 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛾𝛾 + 1 > 𝛾𝛾+𝛾𝛾2
4+𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2
. 
As we can see, these two inequalities cannot go together. There is a trade-off between 
downstream firms. The downstream market becomes monopoly. When access charge is unregulated, 
under legal unbundling, the rival must be more efficient than the downstream incumbent 
whatever  𝛾𝛾  takes because we assume that 𝛾𝛾  is larger than 0. In particular, when goods are 
homogeneous, the rival must be efficient to supply more than twice as much as the downstream 
incumbent is. This is very tough requirement on efficiency for the rival to be active in downstream 
market.  
Finally, we calculate consumer surplus under legal unbundling in a same manner as before.  
Substituting the equilibrium values  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  and  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  for  𝑖𝑖 = 1,2  into the utility function rewritten, then 
we have  
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 ≡
(4 − 3𝛾𝛾2)(5 − (2 − 𝛥𝛥)𝛥𝛥) − 4𝛾𝛾3(1 − 𝛥𝛥)8(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 + 𝐼𝐼 . (3-28) 
                                                   
43 We can derive the inequalities in the text by calculating 4 + 𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾
− (𝛾𝛾 + 1) = 4
𝛾𝛾
− 𝛾𝛾 > 0 
4 + 𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾
−
𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾24 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 = 2(2 − 𝛾𝛾)(2 + 𝛾𝛾)2𝛾𝛾(4 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2) > 0 
and  𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾24 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 − (𝛾𝛾 + 1) = −(2 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 + 𝛾𝛾)(2 + 𝛾𝛾)4 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛾𝛾 < 0 
 
𝜋𝜋0
𝐿𝐿 = (1 + 𝛥𝛥)24(2 + 𝛾𝛾), 
  𝜋𝜋1𝐿𝐿 = (4 + (1 − 𝛥𝛥)𝛾𝛾)�−4𝛥𝛥 + 𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛾𝛾 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛥𝛥)�4(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2   and  𝜋𝜋2𝐿𝐿 = (𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾 − 1)2(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2  
 
 
(3-27) 
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3.6. Comparison of vertical integration and legal unbundling 
In this section, we compare the SPNE values obtained under vertical integration with that under legal 
unbundling. We focus on values realized under unregulated access charge. The results are as follow. 
Both access charge and prices for each goods under vertical integration are lower than those under 
legal unbundling; 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 < 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  and  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 < 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  for  𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 .  Quantity for the downstream incumbent 
under vertical integration is also smaller than that under legal unbundling, while quantity for the 
rival is larger ; 𝑞𝑞1𝑉𝑉 < 𝑞𝑞1𝐿𝐿  and  𝑞𝑞2𝑉𝑉 > 𝑞𝑞2𝐿𝐿 . Total quantity under vertical integration is larger than that 
under legal unbundling; 𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉 > 𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿 . In other words, compared to the individual quantities under 
vertical integration, under legal unbundling the reduction in rival’s quantity is bigger than the 
increase in the incumbent’s quantity. Under both vertical forms, the downstream incumbent supplies 
more than the rival;  𝑞𝑞1𝑓𝑓 > 𝑞𝑞2𝑓𝑓   for  𝑓𝑓 = 𝑉𝑉,𝐿𝐿. Regarding the prices, if we assume 𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑐𝑐2, price of 
goods 1 is no higher than price of goods 2 when the rival is not less efficient so much for 𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1)  
or the rival is at least equally efficient for  𝛾𝛾 = 1; formally they are expressed that  𝑃𝑃1𝑉𝑉 ≤ 𝑃𝑃2𝑉𝑉  if   𝛥𝛥 ≥ 𝑘𝑘�8+𝛾𝛾(4−𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2)�−(1+𝛾𝛾)
2[𝑘𝑘(2−𝛾𝛾)(3+2𝛾𝛾)−1]   and  𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑃𝑃2𝐿𝐿  if  𝛥𝛥 ≥  1+𝛾𝛾3−𝛾𝛾. All above are calculated in Appendix 6. We 
obtain proposition 2 below.  
 
Proposition 2  
Under which the access charge is unregulated,  
(A) total output is larger and access charge is lower under vertical integration than legal 
unbundling,  
(B) for downstream incumbent goods, its price is higher and its output is larger under legal 
unbundling than vertical integration, and 
(C) the downstream incumbent is competitive under both vertical forms. In particular under legal 
unbundling, the downstream incumbent strengthens its competitiveness and expands its output. 
 
Proposition 2 can be interpreted as follow. 
 
Proposition 2(A). Under vertical integration, no matter which the rival is equally, more or less 
efficient than the downstream incumbent, the effect of mitigating the double marginalization 
problem is more than the potential effect of raising rival’s cost. The integrated firm can set access 
charge at profitable level without sabotage. Under legal unbundling, the upstream monopolist sets 
access charge at high level to enjoy monopolistic profit. Therefore, the access charge is higher under 
legal unbundling than vertical integration. 
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Figure 3-2: Variation in CS between vertical integration and legal unbundling   𝑘𝑘 = 1                      𝑘𝑘 = 2                    𝑘𝑘 = 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For given  𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, 2,3},  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 takes non-negative on height , 𝛥𝛥 takes from 0 to 3 on 
width and  𝛾𝛾  takes from more than 0 to 1 on length by 0.1. 
 
Proposition 2 (B). Under legal unbundling, the downstream incumbent expands its output by taking 
account of the upstream interest from the following reason. As we mentioned, the upstream 
monopolist sets access charge higher, which turns into higher marginal cost for the downstream 
firms. Consequently, the rival is to shrink its output, then its price increases. In contrast, the 
downstream incumbent responds to the rival by expanding its output. This is strategic substitution.  
 
Proposition 2 (C). Under vertical integration, the downstream incumbent supplies more than the 
rival because of the effect of diminishing double marginalization problem. Under legal unbundling, 
the downstream incumbent supplies more than the rival because of considering the upstream profit 
and its effect on the downstream rival. 
 
Calculating variation in consumer surplus between under vertical integration and legal 
unbundling, 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 = 1+𝑘𝑘2[ 9𝛾𝛾4+12𝛾𝛾3𝛥𝛥+4(4−3𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥2+(1−𝛾𝛾2)64]−2𝑘𝑘(8−5𝛾𝛾2+2𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥)
8(𝑘𝑘(8−3𝛾𝛾2)−1)2  −  (4−3𝛾𝛾2)(5−(2−𝛥𝛥)𝛥𝛥)−4𝛾𝛾3(1−𝛥𝛥)8(4−𝛾𝛾2)2   
= −(𝑘𝑘(8−3𝛾𝛾2+𝛾𝛾2[𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾])+[𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾]−1)(𝛾𝛾(4+𝛾𝛾2+3𝛾𝛾(1−𝛥𝛥))−4(1−𝛥𝛥)+𝑘𝑘(32−64𝛥𝛥−𝛾𝛾2(36+𝛾𝛾�28−3𝛾𝛾(3+3𝛾𝛾−5𝛥𝛥)�−68𝛥𝛥)))
8(4−𝛾𝛾2)2(𝑘𝑘(8−3𝛾𝛾2)−1)2   
 
 
(3-29) 
 
It is difficult to see that which consumer surplus is larger by equation above because the equation is 
expressed by three parameters. Instead, we reduce the parameters from three to two by fixing  𝑘𝑘 for 
some values:  𝑘𝑘 = 2, 𝑘𝑘 = 1 and  𝑘𝑘 = 0.5,  and numerically shows how   𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 changes 
in  𝛥𝛥 and 𝛾𝛾  . In Figure 3-2, taking  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 on height,  𝛥𝛥 on widths, and  𝛾𝛾  on lengths, we can 
see that  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 > 0  for  𝑘𝑘 ∈ {0.5, 1, 2}. Therefore, we say consumer surplus under vertical 
integration is larger than legal unbundling, and obtain Proposition 3 as follow. 
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Proposition 3 
When access charge is unregulated, consumer surplus under vertical integration is higher than legal 
unbundling  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 > 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿. 
 
In this section, under unregulated access charge, we compared the outcome of vertical integration to 
that of legal unbundling from the point of view of consumers. Summarizing, total output and 
consumer surplus are larger under vertical integration than legal unbundling. Vertical integration 
outperforms legal unbundling if the upstream monopolist is not regulated. 
 
3.7. Discussion and conclusion  
Under ownership unbundling, when access charge is unregulated, we can imagine that the double 
marginalization problem becomes more severe. In this sense, perfect legal unbundling without any 
bias is better than ownership unbundling. As Höffer and Kranz (2011 b) say, under regulated 
constant access charge, when legal unbundling is imperfect such that the upstream monopolist has a 
bias in favor of its parent firm in downstream, ownership unbundling can be better in terms of total 
output. Specifically, if the bias is to be active immediately after the parent downstream firm initially 
holds ownership share, downstream market becomes monopoly under legal unbundling, so 
ownership unbundling is desirable by shutting the bias out of the upstream monopolist.   
    In this study, assuming that access charge is unregulated and chosen endogenously by the 
upstream monopolist, we compared which vertical form is better in terms of total output and 
consumer surplus under vertical integration or legal unbundling in differentiated quantity 
competition model. We consider not only sabotage but also margin squeeze. Sabotage and margin 
squeeze are not coincident. When the access charge is unregulated, if the integrated firm has an 
incentive to do sabotage, the rival is to be foreclosed from the market, whereas if the integrated firm 
prices in which margin squeeze happens, the rival’s quantity decreases but the rival can be active in 
the downstream market. We finally show that vertical integration is better, which result is contrast to 
existing literature which say that, under regulated access charge, the total output under legal 
unbundling is equal to or bigger than vertical integration. This result comes from what the effect of 
overcoming double marginalization problem is larger than potential effect of raising rival’s cost.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 0    if   𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 >  𝑘𝑘�  > 18 − 3𝛾𝛾2 ≥ 𝛾𝛾4(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥 + 𝛾𝛾3 when  𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1 > ?̃?𝛥  
or   if  𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 > 𝑘𝑘�  > 𝛾𝛾4(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥 + 𝛾𝛾3 > 18 − 3𝛾𝛾2  when 1 > 𝛥𝛥 > ?̃?𝛥  . 
 
No matter which 𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1  or  𝛥𝛥 < 1, it holds that 𝑘𝑘�  is larger than both  1
8−3𝛾𝛾2
  and  𝛾𝛾
4(2−𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥+𝛾𝛾3. Thus, 
we have   𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 0  for any   𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 > 𝑘𝑘�  . Hence, the unregulated access charge is always 
positive  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 > 0, regardless the rival is more or less efficient than the integrated downstream, 
i.e.  𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1  or  𝛥𝛥 < 1  ∎  
 
Appendix 2 
Assuming  𝑃𝑃2𝑉𝑉  ≥ 𝑐𝑐2, it must satisfy 2𝛥𝛥[2𝑘𝑘(3 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1] − 𝛾𝛾(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)2[𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1] ≥ 0  if  𝑘𝑘 > 𝑘𝑘�   and  𝛥𝛥 ≥ ?̃?𝛥′ ≡ [𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1]𝛾𝛾2[2𝑘𝑘(3 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1] 
However, 
?̃?𝛥 − ?̃?𝛥′ = [𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) + 1]𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − [𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1]𝛾𝛾2[2𝑘𝑘(3 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1] = 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘�6 − 2𝛾𝛾2 + 𝑘𝑘(8 − 6𝛾𝛾2 + 𝛾𝛾4)� − 1�2𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(2𝑘𝑘(3 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1) > 0 
Accordingly,  𝛥𝛥 > ?̃?𝛥 > ?̃?𝛥′, thus  𝑃𝑃2𝑉𝑉 > 𝑐𝑐2  ∎ 
 
Appendix 3 
Taking a difference between two values among  𝑤𝑤∗, 𝑤𝑤�   ,𝑤𝑤�  and  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 , they are calculated as  
 
𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝑤𝑤� = (𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)2(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)  , 
𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 = 𝑘𝑘(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2) − 1)(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)  , 
𝑤𝑤� − 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 = (𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝛥𝛥)2(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)   and   𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 −𝑤𝑤� = (𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(−𝑘𝑘(8 − 𝛾𝛾2 − 𝛾𝛾3) − 𝛾𝛾 + 1 + 2𝑘𝑘(4 + 𝛾𝛾 − 2𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥)2�𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 + 𝑘𝑘(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)�(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)   . 
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Appendix 4 
Taking a difference between  𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀  and  𝛾𝛾  , we obtain its sign by calculating as  
   𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 − 𝛾𝛾 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)[𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1]2𝑘𝑘(4 + 𝛾𝛾 − 2𝛾𝛾2) ≥ 0  if  𝑘𝑘 > 𝑘𝑘� > 18 − 3𝛾𝛾2  . 
 
We can see that the sign of 𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾 determines the sign of  𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝑤𝑤� ,   𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 and  𝑤𝑤� − 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 , and that 
the sign of  𝛥𝛥 − 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀   and 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 >  ?̃?𝛥  determines the sign of 𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 − 𝑤𝑤�  . Defined  𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀  is derived from a 
part of numerator of  𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 − 𝑤𝑤�   . Moreover, we have 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 > 𝛾𝛾 under  𝑘𝑘 > 𝑘𝑘�   . Hence, each sign of 
factor must be consist with each other at the equilibrium ∎ 
 
Appendix 5  
Margin squeeze can happen if access charge violates imputation test such that 44   
 
𝑤𝑤 > 𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿 ≡ 2 − 𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 
 
To know whether unregulated optimal access charge violates the imputation test, comparing  𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  to  𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿  ,  
 
𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 −  𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿 = (4 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛾𝛾)2(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)  
𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 >  𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿  if  𝛥𝛥 > (1 + 𝛾𝛾)𝛾𝛾4 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 ≡ 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 
 
This condition of relative efficiency  𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿  is very easy to clear for the rival, even though it is less 
efficient than the incumbent. 
 
Appendix 6 
For access charge,  
𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = −�(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑘𝑘𝛾𝛾2 − 1) + 𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 12(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1) � < 0. 
 
                                                   
44 The imputation test under legal unbundling is drawn by  𝑃𝑃1∗ = 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑤𝑤 + 2−𝛾𝛾𝛥𝛥−𝑤𝑤(4−𝛾𝛾−𝛾𝛾2)4−𝛾𝛾2   , which is different 
in 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 = 0  from that 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 ≥ 0  under vertical integration. 
68 
 
For quantities for individual goods,  
𝑞𝑞1
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑞𝑞1
𝐿𝐿 = −�𝛾𝛾{(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑘𝑘𝛾𝛾2 + 1) + 𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1}2(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1) � < 0 
𝑞𝑞2
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑞𝑞2
𝐿𝐿 = (𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑘𝑘𝛾𝛾2 + 1) + 𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1) > 0 
𝑞𝑞1
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑞𝑞2
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑘𝑘(8 − 𝛾𝛾2 − 4(𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾) − 2𝛥𝛥𝛾𝛾) − 12(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1) > 0 
and  𝑞𝑞1𝐿𝐿 − 𝑞𝑞2𝐿𝐿 = 3 − 𝛥𝛥2(2 − 𝛾𝛾) > 0 
 
For total quantity, 
𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉 − 𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿 = (𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝑘𝑘𝛾𝛾2 + 1) + 𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 12(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)(2 + 𝛾𝛾) > 0   
if  𝛥𝛥 > ?̃?𝛥 > 0 ≥ 1 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2 − 𝛾𝛾3)
𝑘𝑘𝛾𝛾2 + 1   and  𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 + 𝛾𝛾8 − 3𝛾𝛾2 − 𝛾𝛾3 > 𝑘𝑘� 
 
For variation in prices, 
𝑃𝑃1
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃1
𝐿𝐿 = −�𝛾𝛾(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2 + 𝛾𝛾2[𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾]) + [𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾] − 1)2(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1) � < 0 
and  𝑃𝑃2𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃2𝐿𝐿 = −�(2 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2 + 𝛾𝛾2[𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾]) + [𝛥𝛥 − 𝛾𝛾] − 1)2(4 − 𝛾𝛾2)(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1) � < 0 
 
For price differences, assuming  𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑐𝑐2, 
 
𝑃𝑃1
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃2
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑐𝑐1 − 𝑐𝑐2 + −1 − 𝛾𝛾 + 2𝛥𝛥 + 𝑘𝑘(8 + 𝛾𝛾{4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2 } − {12 − 2𝛾𝛾[2𝛾𝛾 − 1]}𝛥𝛥)2(𝑘𝑘(8 − 3𝛾𝛾2) − 1)  
𝑃𝑃1
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃2
𝑉𝑉 ≤ 0  if   𝛥𝛥 ≥ 𝑘𝑘�8 + 𝛾𝛾(4 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾2)� − (1 + 𝛾𝛾)2[𝑘𝑘(2 − 𝛾𝛾)(3 + 2𝛾𝛾) − 1] ≡ 𝑌𝑌(𝑘𝑘, 𝛾𝛾)  and   𝑘𝑘 > 16 + 𝛾𝛾 − 2𝛾𝛾2    
 and   𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃𝑃2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐𝑐1 − 𝑐𝑐2 + 1 + 𝛾𝛾 − (3 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛥𝛥4 − 2𝛾𝛾  
  𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃𝑃2𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0 if  𝛥𝛥 ≥  1 + 𝛾𝛾3 − 𝛾𝛾 ≡ 𝑍𝑍(𝛾𝛾). 
 
These price differences are illustrated in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3- 4. 
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Figure 3-3: Price difference under vertical integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Taking 𝑌𝑌(𝑘𝑘, 𝛾𝛾)on height, 𝑘𝑘 on widths, and  𝛾𝛾  on lengths, we can see that  𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1 ≥ 𝑌𝑌(𝑘𝑘, 𝛾𝛾) for 
any  𝑘𝑘 ∈ [1, 3]  and  𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1] by 0.1. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Price difference under legal unbundling 
 
 
Note: Taking  𝑍𝑍(𝛾𝛾) on height and   𝛾𝛾  on horizontal axis, we can see that   𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1 ≥ 𝑍𝑍(𝛾𝛾) for 
any  𝛾𝛾 ∈ (0,1]  by 0.1. 
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Conclusion  
 
The thesis is constructed by three chapters, each of which is interested in the industries where a 
dominant firm exists in context of vertical relationship. Here, I summarize the results obtained in 
each chapter. Afterward, I propose some plans for future research. 
Chapter 1 estimated the economic effect of the NKK and Kawasaki Steel merger applied by 
conventional event study with using stock return data. As long as focusing on the merging industry, 
the event study shows that the merger is for anti-competitive. However, taking the customer firms 
for the merging industry into account, the merger might not be for anti-competitive. Our results for 
the customer firms as follows: while relatively more significant positive abnormal returns are 
observed in steel-processing industry, there were fewer significant observations in other three 
customer industries. These significant abnormal returns among customer firms are mixed: positive 
and negative. Following the hypothesis that relating the signs of abnormal returns for each firm 
concerned and the effect of merger, then we can propose that the merger was expected to achieve 
efficiency improvements. Even though we employed another estimation model which introduced 
dummy variable, the result of testing abnormal returns was maintained. 
Chapter 2 analyses the effect of policies for fair competition in liberalized electricity market 
where the ownership of cost efficient nuclear power plants matters; specifically, we compared the 
NOME law and public ownership. Recent other work showed that the NOME law would bring larger 
total output. We first set up a model assuming simple as much as previous study, and then compared 
the effect of the NOME law and public ownership. As a result, we found that public ownership 
outperforms the NOME law in terms of total output of electricity. Thus far, contrary to previous 
study, it appears public ownership is superior to the NOME law. Next, we arranged the model in 
more realistic assumption: capacity constraint and fixed costs with respect to nuclear power plants. 
Then, we found that depending on the condition on fixed cost, the NOME law does outperform 
public ownership; the result changed contrary to what obtained under simple assumption. Whereas 
the public ownership seems to be a policy for fair competition, the policy embraces the average cost 
principle; the public firm upstream does not sell nuclear-generated power at marginal cost. Thus, the 
effect of public ownership on electricity downstream market would not be superior to the effect 
under the NOME law according with the size of fixed cost of nuclear power plants. The NOME law 
is not merely proposed political compromise that the incumbent firm resists accepting public 
ownership but has greater economic significance.   
In Chapter 3, we study vertical structures with upstream monopolist by comparing vertical 
integration with legal unbundling. In case of the essential input price is regulated exogenously, if the 
essential input price is low enough, the integrated monopolist raises the downstream rival’s cost and 
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the rival is to be active in the market. In case of the essential input price is unregulated and set by the 
monopolist endogenously, whenever the integrated monopolist has incentive to raise the rival’s cost, 
that is when the rival is never efficient than the downstream affiliate, it sets the essential input price 
lower to raise the rival’s cost higher. At the event, the rival will be foreclosed from the downstream 
market. However, if the downstream goods are differentiated in some degree, the integrated 
monopolist does not raise the rival’s cost even when the rival is less efficient. Under legal 
unbundling where the downstream parent firm still maximizes joint profit as well as vertical 
integration but the upstream monopolist considers only its own profit, the upstream monopolist does 
not have incentive to raise the rival’s cost regardless of that the essential input price is regulated or 
unregulated. Finally, we find that total downstream output and consumer surplus under vertical 
integration are larger than legal unbundling. This result comes from what the effect of overcoming 
double marginalization problem is larger than potential effect of raising rival’s cost.  
Next, for future research, I provide some plans for each chapter as follow. It is said that event 
studies are useful from the point of view of competition policy. To compare the result in Chapter 1, it 
would be good to employ other models of event study, for example GARCH model, Markov 
switching model, among other things. Because the study in Chapter 1 pays attention to mainly 
financial terms, we are not able to suppose specific contents brought by the merger. To complement 
this study, it is recommended to investigate what happened after the merger in real terms. 
    The problem studied in Chapter 2 specifically is from France and can be from Japan because in 
these countries nuclear power has been used as cost efficient generation and has been continued to 
take over to the incumbent. Taking a look other regions, hydro power is cost efficient in Scandinavia 
countries. In addition, photovoltaic power and wind power are increasing widely. Therefore, this 
study is expected to consider other powers but nuclear power and thermal power. Prospect of nuclear 
power should be taken into account carefully. 
Finally, in Chapter 3, when the vertically integrated firm raises the downstream rival’s cost, 
margin squeeze does not happen simultaneously, and vice versa. If the downstream goods are 
imperfect substitute, there are some degrees of range in which neither sabotage nor margin squeeze 
happen. The problem remaining is that to examine how and whether the regulator can choose the 
essential input price accurately to drop in the safe harbor range. If the downstream goods are perfect 
substitute, such a safe harbor input price would be determined in unique. Thus, it might be hard for 
the regulator to choose the unique input price. This problem can be analyzed under which conditions 
of perfect or imperfect information about the cost of upstream monopolist. 
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